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Introduction 
On 6 May 1932 the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives declined to pass along for a full vote in the House a bill that would have 
provided for immediate and complete payment of the Soldiers' Bonus, a small sum of 
money due in 1945 to veterans of World War I. In doing so it set in motion a chain of 
events that led to one of the most sordid affairs in American history, the Bonus March of 
1932, when tens of thousands of World War I veterans traveled to Washington to ask 
their government for their own money, and ended when the U.S. Army was called out to 
forcibly evict them from their shanties on the outskirts of Washington. The perceived 
justice of the veterans' cause, certainly as the years went by if not always at the time, 
combined with the government's violent response to their passive approach, somehow 
made the whole affair seem beneath the dignity of the government and some of the 
officials involved. At the heart of the matter lies the question; what was the 
government's obligation to able-bodied veterans home from war? Strongly held and 
differing opinions on that question eventually led to violence in the summer of 1932. 
In the aftermath of World War I veterans' advocates sought, and in 1924 won, an 
adjustment to the extremely low wages earned by the soldiers of that war. With the 
power to draft an army the government lacked any incentive to pay soldiers a living 
wage, and in the absence of progressive legislation designed to protect soldiers' jobs once 
the fighting was over, those same men often had no jobs to return to. Recognizing the 
injustice of this, Congress passed the Adjusted Service Compensation Act, which granted 
a $1 per day "bonus pay" for each day served during the war, and $1.25 for each day 
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served overseas. In order to overcome political opposition to any pay adjustment at all, 
proponents had to agree to make the bonus payable in 1945. While unpopular, the 
provision was one most veterans could live with until the Great Depression hit them in 
1929. Veterans, like nearly everyone else, suffered immensely from the Great 
Depression. Suddenly in desperate economic shape, many veterans were unwilling to 
wait until 1945 for money they needed immediately. Out of work and often with families 
to feed, many veterans simply couldn't reconcile their present condition with the Bonus 
Certificates they possessed, promising payment for service already performed in what 
may as well have been some future lifetime. Pressure began to build across the country 
to do something to address the veterans' plight. 
In the spring of 1932, following the Ways and Means Committee's refusal to 
support the Patman Bill, which would have provided for immediate payment of the 
bonus, a group of several hundred veterans from Portland, Oregon, set out on a cross-
country trek to Washington, D.C. to demand their money. By the time they reached St. 
Louis, word of their journey had spread across the country, encouraging veterans from all 
over the country to organize marches on Washington. At its peak, police and military 
intelligence estimated the number of veterans in the city at over 20,000, and some 
suggested that as many as 80,000 may have participated in the protest at some point.1 
After forcing a Congressional vote on immediate payment of their bonus, and losing in 
the Senate, the "Bonus Army" vowed to remain in Washington until 1945, if necessary, 
to secure their money. Several weeks later, fearing violence and even revolution, the 
1 Walter W. Waters, B.E.F.; The Whole Story Of The Bonus Army (New York, New York: 
Stratford Press, 1933 ), p. I. 
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Hoover Administration used the U.S. Army to drive the veterans out of the city and their 
camps in the surrounding area. Although they had not secured their bonus and been 
evicted from the city, the veterans' persistence is credited with getting full payment of the 
bonus finally approved in 1936. 
The story of the Bonus March of 1932 as a whole has been well examined. The 
Bonus March by Roger Daniels and The Bonus Army by Paul Dickson and Thomas B. 
Allen are good examples of the scholarship that is available on the Bonus Army today. 
Both books employ a historical narrative format to tell the story of the Bonus 
Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) from a national perspective. The issue of payment of the 
bonus is considered as it affected the nation as a whole, and the leadership and decision-
making processes of both the B.E.F. and the federal government arc examined at the 
macro level. Walter W. Waters is the subject of much attention in both books, as he 
commanded the B.E.F. in Washington and represented it in discussions with federal 
officials. Daniels suggests it was natural to focus on Waters, "the only marcher whose 
name was generally known, both inside the scattered B.E.F. and to the public:'2 George 
Patton, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur receive attention as much for their 
future exploits as for the roles they played as mid-level and senior Army officers 
responsible for leading the expulsion of the veterans from their camps. 3 Hoover the 
President and Hoover the young director of what would later become the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation are naturally given prominence, with Herbert coming across as 
2 Roger Daniels, The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression, (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971 ). p. 128. 
3 Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen. n1e Bonus Army: An American Epic, (New York, New 
York: Walker & Company, 2004), pp.170-183. 
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MacArthur's puppet as the latter simply ignored presidential orders and J. Edgar 
appearing paranoid when he warned that the veterans planned to blow up the White 
House.4 Of all the main players, only Pelham Glassford, Washington D.C.'s Chief of 
Police, is universally praised for his cool-headed management of the crisis, though 
ironically he paid for his far-sightedness with his job.5 In addition, the reader meets 
seemingly disinterested third parties who provide the backdrop to the drama that played 
itself out all around them, such as Washingtonians Evalyn Walsh McLean, owner of the 
Hope Diamond, who famously provided the B.E.F. with gifts of food and money, and 
John Henry Bartlett, who provided land for the veterans to encamp upon. 6 
As well as employing similar framework, both books are generally sympathetic 
toward the veterans, and suggest that national sentiment toward them was generally 
positive. While the main opponent of immediate payment was "big business," they imply 
that the common man provided the veterans "broad national support."7 Daniels claims 
"had there been a national referendum on paying the bonus that spring, it would have 
passed easily." Daniels goes on to suggest that "volunteers and donations from all over 
the country continued to stream toward Washington" to support the veterans. 8 Further 
evidence of national support is offered by Dickson and Allen, who point out that after the 
U.S. Army gassed the veterans and evicted them from Washington, a shocked American 
public "booed the Army and jeered MacArthur" while watching newsreels of the event.9 
4 Daniels, pp. 170-173; Dickson and Allen, p. 124. 
5 Dickson and Allen, pp. 200-201. 
6 Dickson and Allen, pp. 97-99; Daniels, pp. 124-125. 
7 Daniels, pp. 36, 113. 
8 Daniels, p. 113. 
9 Dickson and Allen, p. 193. 
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Daniels states newspapers across the country "insisted that both national honor and the 
people's will called for payment of the bonus."10 Dickson and Allen claim that President 
Hoover "faced a dilemma" in dealing with bonus legislation; Hoover knew paying the 
bonus was fiscally irresponsible, but "the bonus was popular."11 Paul Dickson states that 
the country was so desperate for a good news story in the Depression plagued summer of 
1932 that newspapers, wire services, newsreel producers, and radio stations across the 
country "fell in love" with the Bonus Marchers. 12 Celebrities like Will Rogers, Ernest 
Hemmingway, and Evalyn Walsh McLean weighed in at different times in favor of the 
veterans' petition. 13 
The Bonus March has been thoroughly examined at the national level, but what 
about at the state level or even lower? For example, the B.E.F. was not a single 
homogeneous organization, but a collection of myriad groups of veterans that organized 
at the town and city level, and only merged into a loose confederation with other 
veterans' groups once in Washington. In much of the current research, the B.E.F. is 
treated as a single organization and, with the possible exception of the original group 
under Walter W. Waters from Oregon, very little attention is devoted to the individual 
parts that made up the whole. 
The federal government's reaction to the Bonus March is familiar, but each state 
that lay on the veterans' path to Washington endured its own little "Bonus March," and 
10 Daniels, p. 36. 
11 Dickson and Allen, p. 35. 
12 Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen, The Bonus Army: An American Epic Webcast, 22 June 
2005, Library of Congress, 17 June 2006, 
<http://www.loc.gov/today/cyberlc/feature _ wdesc.php?rec=3 71 O> 
13 Daniels, pp. 36-37; Dickson and Allen, pp. 97-99, 241-242. 
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there is precious little scholarship dedicated to the crisis that the individual states suffered 
as thousands of indigent men poured across their borders. Whereas existing research 
chronicles the actions of the President, the U.S. Army, the Justice Department's Bureau 
of Investigation, and the Washington D.C. Police Department, there is a story to be told 
that mirrors the federal one at the state level. State governors and their National Guards, 
Adjutants General, Departments of Motor Vehicles, and State Police were making 
decisions about how to transport, feed, and house veterans from across the country while 
maintaining order, not unlike the decisions that are already so well recorded at the federal 
level. While authors have narrated and assessed the roles played by men like Waters, 
Hoover (Herbert and J. Edgar), Glassford, and MacArthur in national narratives, what 
about the roles played by men named Dove, Pollard, Swanson, Glass, Waller, and 
Mitchell in Virginia? 
The core question that lay at the heart of the entire Bonus March, that of the 
obligation of the nation to its veterans, is also tackled at the national level in much of the 
current research, with the authors of The Bonus March and The Bonus Army concluding 
that the nation, that is the people at large, sympathized with the veterans' cause, even if 
the government did not. What is largely omitted is the possibility that entire regions of 
the United States might hold a dissenting opinion, and that it is just possible that some 
states might strongly oppose the veterans in their bid for their bonus. 
The gaps in the current research on the Bonus March can be addressed by 
refocusing the narrative on the state and local level, as opposed to the national. Virginia 
offers a superb opportunity to apply the methodology reserved so far for the B.E.F. as a 
7 
whole and the federal government to the state level, primarily because of its proximity to 
the scene of the final action. Because Virginia borders the District of Columbia, it acted 
as a funnel, pouring veterans from across the South and West into Washington, therefore 
ensuring Virginia was going to have to grapple with far more veterans than most of the 
other states. Further, its proximity to Washington meant that Virginia was bound to be a 
player, whether it wanted to be or not, in the ultimate resolution of the crisis. Whether 
the Bonus March ended with the veterans receiving their bonus, the authorities crushing 
the veterans, or in a violent revolution and the toppling of the federal government, 
Virginia was going to have to provide for its own security against whatever might 
transpire in Washington in ways that other states obviously did not. Finally, Virginia and 
Maryland were the only two ways out of the capital for the veterans and, one way or 
another, they were going to have to go home eventually, presenting the state with a last 
crisis to manage. 
While current research clearly implies that the nation at large supported the 
veterans' claim to their bonus, is it possible that Virginia did not concur with the bulk of 
the country? Virginia has as proud a military tradition as any state; would it side with the 
men who wore the nation's uniform in France in 1917, or the men who wore it in 
Washington in 1932, and how would they look upon their own veterans who chose to 
participate in the march? The current research on the Bonus March incorporates 
assessments of the performances of federal officials during the Bonus March. What 
about the performance of Virginia's state officials? How did the Governor and his 
subordinates choose to deal with the tidal wave of veterans from out-of-state, and was 
8 
their response effective? How well did the state government coordinate with county and 
city officials throughout Virginia? Did the government have a plan, or was it largely a 
spectator, reacting to events seemingly beyond its control? These are fair questions that 
federal officials have had to endure, and it may only be right that the same standard be 
applied to the state level. 
This thesis examines several heretofore neglected angles on the Bonus March: the 
participation of Virginian veterans in the Bonus Army, the impact of the march on the 
state, the performance of state officials during the crisis, and the opinion of Virginians as 
a whole on the merits of the march and the veterans' claim to the bonus. By focusing on 
these issues at the state level, rather than the national, one can begin to get an 
appreciation for the challenges that all levels of government had to cope with when the 
veterans finally rose up and came calling for their money. 
Chapter 1: The Invasion of Washington 
Walter W. Waters, a World War I veteran from Portland, Oregon was an 
unemployed cannery worker in the spring of 1932. Having lost faith in his ability to keep 
a job, he began to focus on another route to financial security. Holding a Bonus 
Certificate payable in 1945, he stood up at a veterans rally in March 1932 and suggested 
they all march on Washington and demand their money immediately. Few took him 
seriously, and nothing came from his suggestion. A month later he again addressed a 
gathering of veterans, only to be dismissed a second time. Then in the first week of May 
news arrived from Washington that the Patman Bill had failed to clear the Ways and 
Means Committee, and the next time Waters suggested a march on Washington veterans 
were prepared to listen. By mid-month 300 veterans were prepared to follow Waters to 
Washington, forming the core of what would become the Bonus Expeditionary Force. 
Organizing in military fashion, Waters was eventually elected Regimental Commander, 
and subordinate commanders were appointed. Buglers and first aid teams were assigned 
to "companies," military police were empowered to maintain discipline, and formations 
and marching drills were held.14 It was a model that was to be copied by Bonus Marchers 
from across the country in the weeks that followed. 
Waters' two primary problems as his 300 men set off for Washington were food 
and transportation. The first he solved through requesting donations from towns he 
passed through, often sending parties ahead of the main body to solicit provisions before 
they arrived. For the second he took to the rails. In the America of the 1930s it was 
14 Dickson and Allen, pp. 56-64. 
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common for people to hop a ride on a freight train. Before the automobile became 
commonplace, it was the only way for many who couldn't afford regular tickets to travel 
long distance, and the railroads for the most part looked the other way. 15 Moving 300 
men across the country on freight trains was not the same as moving one or two at a time; 
though, and the group had mixed results, sometimes getting full cooperation from the 
railroads, other times having to block trains from departing entirely to get on board. In 
this manner they worked their way to St. Louis, and from there into the national headlines 
and consciousness. 
In East St. Louis, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad finally stood its ground and 
informed Waters that the veterans would not be permitted to ride its trains free of charge. 
A standoff ensued during which the veterans refused to allow any eastbound train to 
leave town without them aboard, and the railroad responded by rerouting traffic around 
St. Louis to avoid the veterans. Local authorities feared violence, and Governor Louis 
Lincoln Emmerson of Illinois responded by calling out the National Guard, not to arrest 
the veterans, but to provide them transportation by truck across his state, thereby 
preventing violence in Illinois by passing the veterans off to Indiana. Indiana followed 
suit, and soon all the governors were transporting the veterans through their states, 
happily passing o.ff the problem, they reasoned, to the city that created it in the first 
place. 16 When the veterans' standoff with the railroad and authorities in Illinois was 
picked up by the national media, it ignited spontaneous Bonus Marches by veterans from 
15 Dickson and Allen, pp. 64-65. 
16 Daniels, pp. 81-82. 
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cities across the country, all converging on Washington to demand immediate payment of 
the Soldiers' Bonus. 17 
Pelham D. Glassford had been the Chief of the Washington, D.C. Police 
Department less than a year when veterans from around the country began arriving in 
May of 1932. As he scanned news reports and plotted the position of Bonus Marchers on 
a map of the United States, Glassford began to develop a sense of the scale of the thing 
that was about to descend on his city. A retired Army Brigadier General and World War I 
veteran himself, he may have understood better than most how best to handle his fellow 
veterans. Glassford immediately determined that it was in the government's interest to 
help the veterans conduct an orderly protest, rather than oppose them, and set about 
planning where to house the veterans and how to feed them. When his superiors from the 
District's government suggested his policy would simply encourage additional veterans 
to come to the city, Glassford retorted that he'd rather have 10,000 orderly protesters than 
half as many rioters. 18 He focused on a row of dilapidated buildings that dated from the 
Civil War located on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the Capital. 
These buildings were abandoned and scheduled for demolition, clearing the way for a 
new series of buildings belonging to the federal government in what would form the 
Federal Triangle .. Glassford sought and received the permission of the developers, then 
the City of Washington, to house the veterans in those buildings temporarily. As the 
B.E.F. expanded Glassford wanted to settle additional veterans on the outskirts of 
Washington. In addition to a number of other small areas around the city that would 
17 Dickson and Allen, p. 73. 
18 Dickson and Allen, p. 76. 
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become \'eterans' camps. he 5\.-cun:d from one donor a 30-acre plot of prirnte property in 
S.W. Washington which was named Camp Bartlett. nller the O\\ner. which e\'entually 
became the home of Virginia's \'eterans during the Bonus ~larch. 19 In addition to small 
sites in and around the city. Glassford looked across the ri\'er to a much larger location at 
Anacostia Flats. which would bc.-come the main camp for the B.E.F. in the summer of 
1932. 
Anacostia Flats was located on the south bank of the Anacostin Ri\'er in the 
southeast corner of the District of Columbia. and was under the control of the Office of 
Public Buildings and Public Parks. By the first week of June Glassford had secured 
permission for its use. and the first of what would become tholL-.ands of \'Cler.ms mo\'cd 
in and began to build makeshift quarters for themsel\'es. and sometimes their entire 
families. Imitating a phenomenon taking place across the entire country. Anacostia was 
to become one of the largest and certainly best kno\\TI 1 loo\'er\'illes in the nation. a 
collection of makes hi ft shacks which ser\'ed as homes for many ''ho otherwise had none. 
By the middle of June 1932. nearly 25.000 \'eterans were in and around Washington. with 
the largest single group stuffed into Camps ~larks and Sims at Anacostia. 
Although Glassford was busy making preparations to recei\'c tens of thousands of 
\'eterans. he was hoping he might be able to limit their number to something more 
manageable. but to do that he needed help. To that end. he sent his first telegram to 
Virginia Go\'ernor John G. Pollard on 23 ~fay 1932. In it. Glassford asked Pollard to do 
what he could to limit the number of \'eterans tra\'clling to Washington through his state. 
1
• Daniels. pp. I:!-'. l.:!6. l-17. 
13 
Specifically, Glassford requested that Pollard not transport veterans through Virginia 
with government vehicles as so many other governors were doing, and if he did, to 
impress upon the veterans that they were not to stay in Washington longer than 48 hours, 
at which time Virginia would also provide transportation out of the capital. In short, if 
Pollard transported the veterans to Washington, Glassford wanted him to take some 
responsibility for them.20 Pollard did not respond, so Glassford followed up with a 
second telegram four days later, and a letter four 
days after that. After his third attempt in just over 
a week to secure some assistance from the 
Governor of Virginia, Pollard finally responded 
by passing the matter to the Virginia Department 
of the American Legion, though he offered Glenn 
Elliot of that office no guidance on how he was to 
proceed on the matter. He further assured 
Glassford that he had seen "no evidence of the 
Figure 1: Virginia Governor 
John G. Pollard. 
movement (of veterans) and there has as yet been no occasion for any action," and invited 
Glassford to contact him again if there should be any "movement' in the future and the 
Chief of Police should like his help.21 
The Governor's reply was probably more than Glassford could stand. If Pollard 
hadn't seen any movement of veterans in his own state it would only be another three 
20 Pelham D. Glassford to John G. Pollard, 23 May 1932, Governors Papers Collection, Library of 
Virginia. 
21 John G. Pollard to Pelham D. Glassford, 2 June 1932, Governor's Papers Collection, Library of 
Virginia. 
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days before he would, and even so news reports pouring in from cities across the country 
should have alerted Pollard to what was coming just as they had alerted Glassford. 
Further, Pollard was never going to have the luxury of simply passing the veterans on to 
Washington and making them that city's problem the way, say, the Governor of Illinois 
did. Washington's problem was going to be Virginia's problem, if for no other reason 
than simple geography. While Glassford recognized this and reached out to Pollard, the 
Governor seemingly kept his head in the sand, content to react to events rather than 
getting out in front of them. It is not difficult to picture Glassford throwing up his hands 
in frustration to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, for whom he 
worked, ranting that he could get no help from the Commonwealth of Virginia. It must 
have come to something like that, because on 9 June the Commissioners sent their own 
telegram to Governor Pollard adding their voices to their Police Chief's, reiterating the 
challenges the District was facing with so many veterans already present or on the way, 
and again asking for Pollard's help to stem the tide of men advancing through his state.22 
Pollard answered their three-page plea with a two-sentence reply that simply stated that 
he had received their telegram and would continue to cooperate.23 The Commissioners 
must have wondered what cooperation he was referring to, since by that time they would 
have known that_ local authorities in Charlottesville, Danville, and Lynchburg were all 
providing transportation to veterans en route to Washington, contrary to the numerous 
requests of Washington authorities. In any case they gave up hope of getting relief from 
22 Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia to John G. Pollard, 9 June 1932, 
Governor's Papers Collection, Library of Virginia. 
23 John G. Pollard to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 10 June 1932, 
Governor's Papers Collection, Library of Virginia. 
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the south. and the authorities in Washington wouldn't engage Go\'emor Pollard again 
until it was time to think about what to do with the B.E.F. as it left Washington. 
whenever that might be. 
Chapter 2: The Boys from Virginia 
Once the B.E.F. settled into its designated camps, Walter Waters began to work 
on the issue at hand - securing their bonus. He needed 145 Congressmen's signatures on 
a petition to pull the Patman Bill out of committee and put it to a full vote on the House 
floor. The bill would then have to go through two votes in the House. The first would be 
on whether or not to schedule the bill for a full vote, effectively overruling the Ways and 
Means Committee. If that was successful, the second would be on the bill itself. While 
their men milled about the streets of Washington, leaders of the B.E.F. worked the halls 
of Congress, petitioning Congressmen for the required signatures. It took only a couple 
days to find 145 sympathetic lawmakers, significantly only one of whom was from 
Virginia, and on 13 June a majority of Representatives voted in favor of putting the bill to 
the House for a vote.24 In the first indication that Virginia might think very differently 
than the nation at large, Virginia's Representatives voted one for, one absent, and eight 
against sending the bill to the floor for a vote. Speaking for the Virginian majority, 
Representative Clifton A. Woodrum expressed some of their reasons for voting against 
the bill including fear of inflating the currency, thereby setting back economic recovery 
for everyone, and suggested that Virginia's veterans needed no special help as they were 
already scheduled that year to get a new veterans' hospital.25 Agreeing completely with 
his position, the Roanoke Times suggested that Woodrum's reasons for opposing the bill 
were sound "and will commend themselves to the judgment of the voters of the 6th 
24 Dickson and Allen, pp. 89-102. 
25 
"Woodrum Votes Against Bonus," Roanoke Times, 15 June 1932, p. 3. 
16 
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District.''26 Ne\'erthelcss. the Patman Bill ad\'anced to a full rnte in the I louse scheduled 
for 15 June. where the result was expected to be the same as the 13 111 • While Virginia·s 
press was initially no help to the \'eterans. on the day of that first \'Ole in the I louse 
Virginia lent the Bonus Anny a different kind of support. On the morning of 8 June the 
first 25 \'eterans from Virginia had arri\'ed in Washington to join the B.E.F. 
Petersburg was the first community in Virginia to mobilize in support of the 
Bonus March. Ha\'ing watched a small group of Floridians pass through town on 4 June 
before stopping in Richmond. Petersburg·s \·eterans organizi:d and were gone before the 
local press caught wind of them. On the morning of 6 June two automobiles were seen 
driving through town with a banner reading .. Petersburg to \\'ashington .. draped across 
their sides.27 Although reporters attempted to disco\'er the names of the \'cterans within. 
they were gone too quickly. A day later they were seen in Fredericksburg. where 
reporters put their number at 25.~ 8 Fortunately Richmond"s \'eterans took a little longer 
to organize than Petersburg·s. and therefore ga\'e the Richmond press a chance to lca\'c a 
more detailed account of their enterprise. 
The spontaneous nature of the Bonus ~tarch caught Richmond"s \'eterans 
unaware. Nobody had em·isioned a national effort. nobody was prepared. and Virginia's 
veterans were running late if they wanted to get to the capital in time for the \'Ote in the 
House. A couple of Richmond \·eterans. Joe Williams and J.F. Joinville. began to 
organize veterans in that citv bv announcing the creation of a Richmond continl.!ent of the 
- ,,, ,,, ..... -
:
6 
.. The Correct Position:· Rnannk.: Timc:s. 15 June 1932. p. -l. 
:
7 
.. Bonus Band Passes Herc:· l'c:tc:rshurg l'rogrc:.u-lndc:x. 6 June 1932. p. I. 
:s .. Bonus ~!archers Ride Through City:· Frc:dc:rickshurg Frei: l.ancl'-Star. 8 June 1932. p. I. 
18 
B.E.F. Williams posted banners in business and residential districts, in addition to 
driving trucks through town with banners on the side announcing a planning session to be 
held on 10 June. Joinville began to work out transportation to Washington for what he 
estimated would be a 200-man group. Events in Washington were beginning to dictate a 
compressed timeline to Williams and Joinville. The House of Representatives was 
scheduled to begin debate on immediate payment of the bonus on 13 June, and if they 
were going to get to Washington in time to be there for a possible vote, they needed to be 
on the road by the 11 th.29 Perhaps because there was so little time to prepare, Williams 
seems to have focused his recruiting efforts primarily on Richmond, as there is no 
evidence that he reached out to surrounding communities in Virginia. 
Figure 2: Bonus Marchers from Richmond prepare to depart/or Washington. 
On Friday night, 10 June, more than 200 World War I veterans met at the Labor 
Temple on 11th and Marshall Streets in Richmond to organize the Richmond contingent 
of the B.E.F. Assembled by Williams and Joinville, the veterans quickly organized 
29 
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themselves along military lines, and selected Thomas B. Dove, a veteran of the 4th 
Division during the war, as their commander. Additional leadership posts went to J.K. 
Sullivan, C.C. Grotz, and B.E. Chalkley. It is not clear why Dove was selected ahead of 
the others for the position of commander, as he was not one of the gentlemen who 
organized the meeting in the first place, and seemed to demonstrate no special leadership 
qualities at the meeting. While Sullivan, Joinville, Williams, and an official from the 
Richmond office of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (V.F.W.) addressed the assembled 
veterans on the importance of good behavior and military discipline, no record exists of 
any substantial address made by Dove. Nevertheless, Dove chose his staff and on the 
morning of the 11th the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F. set out to join the main body 
in Washington. 
J.F. Joinville had been tasked with the responsibility of arranging transport for the 
entire group to Washington, and he was under the impression that he had obtained 
approval from the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad for the use of two 
box cars on 11 June from Richmond to Washington. When the 200 men of the Richmond 
B.E.F. arrived at the rail yard, however, they were told they would not be allowed free 
use of the railroad. Although the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad had 
already made a regular habit of allowing veterans from outside Virginia free passage on 
its trains through the state, they declined to offer the same hospitality to Virginia's own 
veterans.3° Faced with this unanticipated roadblock, the Richmond B.E.F. began to come 
apart before it even left the city. Nearly half of the veterans quit the enterprise right then 
30 
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and there, sufficiently dejected by the train episode that they decided to simply go home. 
The other half stuck it out, and after a full night of negotiating with the railroad and 
looking for truck transportation, just over 100 veterans were permitted to board a 
northbound train early on the morning of the 12th.31 By that afternoon they were outside 
Alexandria encamped in an abandoned gas station, and later moved to the barn of an 
Figure 3: The leaders of the 
Richmond contingent. From left 
to right; Thomas B. Dove, C. C. 
Grotz, and B.E. Chalkley. 
abandoned electric train line. Richmond 
merchants had already sent provisions north to 
support their veterans, and local residents 
provided large donations of food and coffee. At 5 
A.M. on the morning of 13th, the 100 men of the 
Richmond B.E.F. set out on foot for Washington 
and settled into camp near Congress Heights in 
the extreme southeast of the District of 
Columbia.32 
While they didn' t make any special effort to recruit from outside the city of 
Richmond before they departed for Washington, the leaders of the Richmond contingent 
must have hoped to add to their number along the way. If they did they may have been 
disappointed, be".ause Fredericksburg, the largest city on their route, produced only a 
handful of additional veterans. Harry Ridge, formerly of the United States Marine Corps 
(U.S.M.C.), spread the word throughout town that any veterans wishing to join the B.E.F. 
31 
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in Washington should gather in front of the Fredericksburg courthouse at 2 P.M. on 11 
June, reasoning that they "might as well starve in Washington as starve in 
Fredericksburg."33 From there he had no idea whatsoever how to get to Washington, so 
the following day the small number of veterans who had answered his call were seen 
loitering around town looking for a ride to the capital. Upon hearing that the Richmond 
contingent was leaving Richmond that day, Ridge decided to join that group as it passed 
through Fredericksburg, and by 13 June they were at Congress Heights with the rest of 
the Virginians. 34 One Fredericksburg veteran is an interesting case because, unlike many 
or maybe even most of the men who left home to march on the capital, E.R. Lewis quit a 
job to join the B.E.F. Lewis was employed by the Battlefield Park Commission until he 
simply stopped showing up for work on 3 June. His supervisor later discovered that 
Lewis had reported to the commission's main office to collect his last two weeks' pay of 
$24 and gone north to join the Bonus March on his own. Although he was only earning 
about $2 a day, Lewis represented veterans who felt strongly enough about their bonus 
that they would leave work that many would have been glad to have at the time. In 
addition to leaving steady employment, Lewis was one of the many veterans who brought 
his wife with him, adding an additional dimension to the Bonus March. 35 
There is evidence of only one other community in Virginia attempting to organize 
an independent contingent of Bonus Marchers. In Charlottesville, former Sergeant W.T. 
Calder announced that he had organized 60 veterans to join the B.E.F., and expected up 
33 
"Bonus Army Still Sticking on Job," Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 10 June 1932, p. l. 
34 
"Washington Still Marchers Mecca," Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 11 June 1932, p. I. 
35 
"Bonus Marchers Pass Through City," Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 7 June 1932, p. I. 
22 
to 200 to join him by 16 June. Calder planned to advance to Washington through 
Gordonsville, Orange, and Fredericksburg, picking up as many veterans as he could 
along the way. The Daily Progress immediately condemned the idea, expressing its hope 
that the veterans of their city would reconsider heckling a weak Congress into doing 
something that would hurt the nation's economy, and concluded by admonishing the 
veterans that "these are not methods of citizen or soldier."36 In any case, it is likely that 
the Charlottesville contingent never got off the ground, as there is no further mention of it 
in any of Virginia's newspapers studied. Calder made his announcement on 14 June, and 
didn't plan to depart until 16 June at the very earliest. By then the Senate was already 
debating the Patman Bill and on 18 June voted it down. As Charlottesville was already 
so late in organizing, it is likely that when word reached the assembling veterans that the 
Patman Bill had died in the Senate they simply didn't continue, at least not as an 
organized group. If any local veterans did travel to Washington they probably did it in 
small groups or individually, hitching on with the hundreds of out-of-state veterans 
passing through Charlottesville, and merging with the Richmond B.E.F. in Washington if 
they could find it. 
Who were these Virginians who felt strongly enough about their right to 
immediate payment of their bonus that they traveled to Washington to join the Bonus 
Expeditionary Force? Very little information is available about them individually. There 
are seemingly no published interviews with Virginian Bonus Marchers in the years after 
the event, and most newspaper accounts from 1932 offer little biography of their leaders. 
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The Richmond contingent commander, Thomas B. Dove, served with the 58th Infantry of 
the 4th Division during the war, W.T. Calder was a sergeant with the 29th Infantry 
Division,37 and Harry Ridge served in the U.S.M.C. But service information about the 
rest of the leaders is not available. In 1919 Virginia established the Virginia War History 
Commission, charged with documenting Virginia's contribution to World War I. The 
commission passed voluntary surveys to each of Virginia's nearly 80,000 World War I 
veterans, only 15,000 of whom bothered to fill it out and return it. Of the eleven 
Virginian B.E.F. leaders mentioned in newspaper accounts by name, not one filled out his 
survey.38 In addition, military records for all eleven were destroyed in a 1973 fire at the 
National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis which consumed 80 percent of all service 
members' records who were discharged between 1912 and 1960.39 
What we can surmise about them is that they must have been an especially 
determined group, at least the ones who stuck it out through the failure to get a train on 
the first day. Of the highest estimate of 25,000 veterans who occupied the capital, reports 
never place the strength of the Richmond B.E.F. at more than 300, with scattered 
individuals from around the state swelling their numbers slightly.40 Walter Waters was 
later able to produce roster sheets of the B.E.F. that listed 259 Virginians, placing 
Virginia 26th among the states in terms of number of veterans who participated in the 
37 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 13 June 1932, p. l; Charlottesville Daily Progress, 14 June 1932, p. 
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Bonus March.41 Waters claimed he had lost about half his roster sheets, so if one 
assumes the lost sheets were spread evenly across the entire B.E.F. and not limited to 
veterans from any one state (perhaps a bit of a stretch), the total number of Virginias who 
participated in the Bonus March at some point may have been a little over 500. 
Assuming then a top strength of 300 at any one time, Virginia's contribution to the 
overall B.E.F. represented about 1.2 percent of its total, and only 0.4 percent of Virginia's 
World War I veterans. Given these small numbers, these men must have represented the 
most hard-core proponents of immediate payment of the bonus, with the vast majority of 
Virginia's World War I veterans choosing to stay at home rather than journey to 
Washington. 
41 Waters, p. 258. 
Chapter 3: "Virginia Regrets" 
While Virginian merchants and private citizens provided the Richmond B.E.F. 
with food, landowners looked the other way when their fields were used for sleep or 
abandoned buildings used for shelter, government officials coordinated with relief 
agencies for provisions, and railway officials eventually allowed them passage on their 
trains, not all Virginians were solidly behind the veterans' cause. The editorial boards of 
Virginian newspapers could be brutal in their contempt for the Bonus Marchers, and were 
unsupportive when Virginians joined the B.E.F. in Washington. Upon learning that some 
of Richmond's own were going to join the B.E.F., the Richmond News Leader best 
summarized the opinion of the state's press: 
Virginia had heretofore observed a reasonable attitude toward a policy which ... 
will bankrupt the treasury. Nowhere have a larger percentage of ex-servicemen 
opposed bonus legislation. Most Virginians veterans felt that they could well 
emulate their fathers and grandfathers who, after four years of the direst hardships 
that war has ever brought on a people, were content to live in the memory of duty 
done. We are sorry this record is marred by this futile march.42 
This begs the question; why did so many oppose payment of the Soldiers' Bonus as 
strongly as they did? What were the arguments Virginia's press used in opposition to the 
bonus? 
In editorial sections studied from fourteen Virginian newspapers in the summer of 
1932, ranging from large city daily papers to small county weeklies, from every 
geographical area of the state, and from before the veterans appeared in Washington until 
after their camps were nothing but smoldering ashes, not a single one was ever supportive 
of immediate payment of the Soldiers' Bonus. Every one of them remained firmly and 
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consistently opposed to the veterans' cause throughout the Bonus March. In their 
editorial sections, they stated a number of reasons for opposing early payment of the 
bonus. First, there was the question of whether an able bodied veteran of war was 
entitled to compensation in any form. None of 
the papers denied that wounded veterans or the 
families of deceased soldiers must be taken care 
of, but the Richmond Times-Dispatch called 
attention to the fact that those veterans who were 
not wounded in the war had no claim to a bonus 
of any sort, as they were chosen for military 
service precisely because they represented the 
fittest among them, were still under 40 years of 
age, were stronger than most of their fellow 
citizens, and therefore had no excuse for not 
Figure 4: "How Times Have 
Changed! " One paper regrets that 
Americans are looking to 
Washington where they once looked 
only to themselves. 
scrapmg out some kind of a living.43 The Petersburg Progress-Index agreed, and 
supported its position with an analysis of the support provided to veterans by each of the 
belligerent powers of World War I concluding that, by the standards of the rest of the 
world, the American system was relatively generous. No other nation offered able-
bodied veterans a lump-sum payment of any kind. Instead, they provided pension 
systems that only aided "those partly or wholly disabled in the war and to the dependents 
of those who died in service. ' While the paper stopped short of calling American war 
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veterans greedy vis-a-vis their former allies and foes, it did note "the idea of a bonus for 
military service in the World War is distinctly American."44 By the following week the 
Progress-Index had read its history and noted that this was not the first time American 
soldiers marched upon their government demanding money in the wake of a war. 
Supporting its earlier thesis that the idea of cash bonuses for able-bodied veterans was a 
uniquely American idea, the paper cited examples of past clashes between the 
government and its veterans over money, and proudly noted that the government had not 
previously caved to the demands of its veterans, implying nor should it do so in the 
present crisis.45 
The suffering of so many people as a result of the Great Depression weighed 
heavily on the minds of some who couldn't understand why veterans should receive more 
assistance than their countrymen. The Waverly Dispatch in Sussex thought that the 
veterans would have acquitted themselves better by going to Washington to propose "a 
new economic deal" for all the country's unemployed, using that exact term only a year 
before President Roosevelt made it famous, rather than seeking quick cash for 
themselves.46 The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot concurred when it stated "the nation can not, 
in fairness to millions in no better case, further this quest.'.47 The Daily Progress in 
Charlottesville would see any available funds spent on relief or charity, and was certain 
that paying the bonus represented neither, calling it "more like trading with the enemy."48 
4. 
44 
"The Government And The Veteran," Petersburg Progress-Index, 7 June 1932, p. 5. 
45 
"Special Rewards To War Veterans," Petersburg Progress-Index, 11 June 1932, p. 5. 
46 
"Congress Says Bonus Army is Annoying," Waverly Dispatch, 1 July 1932, p. 1. 
47 
"The Tattered March-Past," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 June 1932, p. 5. 
48 
"Give Them Travel Pay and Send Them Back," Charlottesville Daily Progress, 2 June 1932, p. 
28 
Also thinking about the nation as a whole, the Lynchburg Daily Advance called 
immediate payment of the bonus an "obstacle ... placed in the way of an improvement in 
the economic and financial situation."49 The Roanoke Times opposed inflating the 
currency, as the government would surely have to do in order to pay the bonus, thereby 
damaging the credit of the United States and postponing a return to prosperity for 
everyone. 50 The Alexandria Gazette agreed, going a step further to point out the 
disastrous historical examples of inflation and hyper-inflation caused by printing extra 
money in the Confederate States of America and post-World War l Germany and 
Russia.51 In an era when balancing the federal budget was actually taken seriously, the 
Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch wondered if the veterans thought the government had some 
"magic method" of raising funds and, assuring them that it did not, suggested that the 
country simply couldn't afford to pay the bonus at this time.52 The Danville Register 
hoped the government would hold firm as well, claiming it had just balanced the budget, 
would undermine its recent good work by paying the bonus, and would undoubtedly 
"precipitate ... another financial crisis" should it do so.53 Following a speech to veterans 
in which retired U.S. Marine Corps General Smedley D. Butler told them to stick to their 
guns, that they are better than their fellow citizens, the Alexandria Gazette made clear 
that we had no military aristocracy in this country, that veterans are no different than 
49 
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anyone else, and a very legitimate reason for opposing immediate payment of the bonus 
would be "the fear of military domination in this country."54 
There were counterarguments to each of the above positions to be sure. 
Proponents of immediate payment of the bonus would claim that inflating the currency 
would only put extra dollars in the pockets of businessmen, stimulating an economy that 
needed it desperately. 55 Veterans might agree that many of them returned unharmed, but 
would argue that their wartime salary was about 1/20th that of a typical dockworker who 
stayed home, and they should not have been financially penalized for answering their 
nation's call.56 Claims that the country simply couldn't afford the bonus might be met 
with the disdain that Will Rogers showed when he claimed that was "applesauce," that 
the country was not broke, and if it was how was it that automobile manufacturers were 
months behind in their orders?57 However valid some of these arguments may have been, 
the fact is that the news media in Virginia didn't make or support a single one of them, 
holding firm throughout the summer of 1932 that not only was there no compelling 
reason to pay the bonus, but there were actually quite a lot of reasons for not giving the 
veterans a dime. 
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Chapter 4: Southern Hospitality 
Bordering the District of Columbia as it does, Virginia had a unique opportunity 
to host veterans from all across the South and West en route to the capital. Arriving in 
only a trickle at first, by mid-June some towns had already handled several thousand 
veterans passing through. Traveling Bonus Marchers found that there were sometimes 
two Virginias waiting for them; one that went out of its way to extend a helping hand, 
and another that could be cold and uninviting, making it perfectly clear that the veterans 
were not always welcome. 
Virginians didn't fully understand the scale of the impending Bonus March when 
the first 44 members of the Florida contingent arrived in Richmond on 5 June, with 150 
more expected the next day. They were met with food and places to sleep by the 
Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America, arranged for by Richmond Captain of 
Detectives A.S. Wright.58 Stories oflocal hospitality abounded in Virginia's newspapers, 
especially in the early days of the Bonus March. The day after Detective Wright met the 
first Floridians with food and accommodations, a follow-on contingent from the Florida 
group told a Richmond reporter about a former German soldier, employed now in the 
United States as a railroad worker, who provided the veterans with sandwiches and coffee 
at his own expense. 59 In Charlottesville 2,500 Bonus Marchers from the western states 
moved through the city in the first two weeks of June. Most of the marchers had been 
moved to Charlottesville from Roanoke through Lynchburg, with transportation provided 
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by each of those cities to the next in the line. Charlottesville Chief of Police Maurice F. 
Greaver set veterans up at the local National Guard Armory, moving groups as large as 
600 per day through town after a night of sleep and a meal on the city.60 By mid-July 
Greaver had handled nearly 4,000 veterans in this manner with hardly an incident, 
prompting the commander of an outfit from South Carolina to write a letter to the Chief 
thanking him for "the courteousness shown us during our need by your kind and public 
spirited officers."61 Commenting on Virginia's hospitality, one group from Wisconsin 
reported "Richmonders ... have been very kind to us. We stopped in several grocery 
stores ... and were not refused food a single time."62 As late as 18 July Richmond was 
providing so much food for traveling Bonus Marchers that a group of 35, the last group to 
leave Richmond before the Army routed the marchers out of Anacostia, claimed they 
were reluctant to leave the city, as they had eaten well there and didn't know if they 
would do so in Washington.63 In Danville the leader of a group of 23 veterans from 
Florida noted that city was the single most hospitable town they had encountered on their 
entire trip. Having become separated from their main group, the 23 men were given food 
and fuel by the Danville Police Department before continuing north.64 Danville coped 
effectively with much larger groups as well. Adding to the number of veterans 
Lynchburg was. already receiving from Roanoke, Danville began sending hundreds of 
veterans to Lynchburg in the first week of June. The first large group of200 veterans had 
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been dropped at the city limits by trucks from Greensboro, North Carolina, on the 
evening of 6 June, and within two hours the city had rounded up enough trucks to ship 
the men on to the small town of Gretna, whose mayor telephoned the Danville Police 
Department to object, stating that Gretna simply didn't have the ability to deal with such 
a large group. Danville Mayor Harry Wooding relented, and Danville picked up the 
additional cost of moving the veterans through Gretna and on to Lynchburg.65 
Truckloads of veterans continued through Danville over the next week, nearly all of 
which followed the same route from Danville to Lynchburg, then on to Charlottesville 
and finally Washington. 
,,.,"l'>' Veterans from Virginia 
- Veterans from the South and West 









Figure 5: Major routes traveled through Virginia by veterans; June-July 1932. 
Many groups of veterans did not impose on local communities for food, shelter, 
and transportation. On 9 June one such group of 200 veterans from Georgia moved 
through Petersburg in seven large trucks and, other than needing to buy gasoline, were 
"plentifully supplied with provisions" of their own. After obtaining their gasoline and 
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spending the night in Petersburg, the group made camp in Colonial Heights just across 
the Appomattox River, where they cooked their breakfast over open fires and were off to 
Washington by that afternoon.66 One veteran, who hadn't imposed on a single person for 
charity between his home in Indiana and Virginia, suddenly needed help when he reached 
Winchester. In what was surely a humorous episode for everyone but him, Vernon 
Spencer burned every dollar he had when he disposed of an old pair of trousers, pockets 
stuffed with cash, in a camp fire. He turned to social workers in that town to get him the 
rest of the way to Washington. 67 
Not everyone welcomed veterans on their way through Virginia, and chief among 
them were the railroads, which fought all summer to keep veterans off their trains 
whenever possible. In one example of a cat and mouse game taking place across the 
state, a group of 206 veterans was stranded in Culpepper when the train crew released the 
cars that they were riding in. The train crew reported that the railroad had issued 
instructions to them not to carry veterans over the border into the District of Columbia. 
Some of the men asserted it was the third time they'd been thrown off a train since they 
left their homes in South Carolina and Georgia.68 As mentioned earlier, Virginia's own 
veterans from Richmond were initially thwarted in their attempt to travel to Washington 
by train. Besides the nuisance the veterans represented, railroads needed to discourage 
veterans from hopping free rides for safety reasons. In a tragic example of rail mishaps 
probably taking place across the country, Charles Jacobsen, a Bonus Marcher from 
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Dansbury, Iowa, was struck by a train in Richmond when he fell asleep on the tracks, of 
all places. He was critically injured and was not expected to survive.69 
In addition to the railroads, transient veterans began to encounter resistance from 
local communities in Virginia as the Bonus March wore on. Lynchburg was the first to 
take a stand against Bonus Marchers traveling through town. While Lynchburg initially 
provided transportation for 600 men and fed 500 of them, the City Council voted on 13 
June that no further support would be provided to veterans. Calling the veterans' stay in 
Lynchburg a "hold up," the Council determined that from that point forward the entire 
city police force in conjunction with the National Guard would be used to force veterans 
to move on.70 In Richmond veterans complained that police officers were squeezing 
them for $1 fines, citing vagrancy laws that didn't even exist.71 In Roanoke the service 
officer of Blue Ridge Post 484 of the V.F.W. announced that, as his committee had all it 
could handle just providing food for needy Roanoke veterans, it would not provide free 
meals to Bonus Marchers en route to Washington. At a subsequent meeting of the Post 
484 leadership the service officer was overruled, but no doubt many hungry veterans had 
passed through the city by then without the benefit of a meal from the V.F.W.72 City 
officials in Roanoke were determined to keep veterans from coming to the city at all, but 
were quickly overwhelmed by sheer numbers. After a tip from officials in Bristol warned 
that a large group of veterans was en route from that city, Roanoke City Manager W.P. 
Hunter determined to meet the veterans outside the city limits to steer them to another 
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place. A veteran on the first truck he encountered informed Hunter that there were 450 
men en route behind him who could be expected shortly, and by 10 June there were over 
500 veterans in Roanoke. Unable to keep them out of the city, Hunter was compelled to 
house them in the City Auditorium.73 Officials authorized the purchase of enough food 
for two meals, and then tackled the problem of getting rid of them. Showing, according 
to the Roanoke Times, "no more intelligence" than authorities in neighboring cities, the 
City Council "passed the buck" to Lynchburg, perpetuating what the Times called "a 
sorry mess."74 When estimates from railroad companies to move the veterans came in 
higher than expected, the city decided to pay $205 to a trucking company to move them 
on to Lynchburg, and then announced it would take no further steps to assist any more 
Bonus Marchers. 75 
Residents of Fredericksburg had relatively little interaction with veterans as they 
passed through on their way to Washington. Observing that the veterans had been 
traveling through town for several days in the first week of June, the Free Lance-Star 
reported that only a single group of 100 had actually stayed overnight in Fredericksburg, 
and that they had been well behaved. 76 Although the city was able to avoid providing 
transportation and other services to the Bonus Marchers as they made their way to the 
capital, in the first days of the Bonus March Fredericksburg had the opposite experience 
of wrestling with veterans on their way out of, rather than towards, Washington. As early 
as 9 June people began to notice disgruntled veterans traveling in the opposite direction, 
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already despairing of ever receiving their bonus and returning home. 77 Many feared they 
were merely the first in what might be an avalanche of angry men stranded in their area 
when the Bonus March collapsed, and were immediately nearly proven right. In 
Washington, the District Commissioners' first plan to bring the Bonus March to a 
peaceful conclusion was simply to load the men up on trucks, drive them 50 miles outside 
of town, and dump them, a plan that the Free Lance-Star noted would place the bulk of 
the B.E.F. right in Fredericksburg.78 A week later Washington authorities did just that, 
using three District of Columbia garbage trucks to drop off 47 men in front of the town 
courthouse. Their arrival was completely unannounced, and City Manager L.J. Houston 
quickly arranged for two southbound trucks to haul the veterans to North Carolina, at the 
small cost of $10.79 That was the only group of veterans unilaterally shipped to 
Fredericksburg, but the fear of mass lawlessness from an army of unemployed men in 
their midst continued to hang over Northern Virginia for the duration of the Bonus 
March. 
Despite the cold reception they sometimes received, the veterans who passed 
through Virginia were generally well behaved, belying the fears of many law 
enforcement officials who expected the worst. The Richmond Times-Dispatch 
editorialized that it was "called upon to applaud the cool-headedness displayed thus far 
by the 'B.E.F.'," and local officials often commented on the good conduct of veterans, 
such as when police officers in Lynchburg reported that one group of veterans passing 
77 
"Bonus Soldiers En Route Home," Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 9 June 1932, p. 1. 
78 Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 10 June 1932, p. 1. 
79 "Dump Three Truck Loads Of Bonus Marchers Here," Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 16 
June 1932, p. 1. 
37 
through was "unusually quiet despite rumors of disorder along the way."80 Virginia State 
Adjutant-General S. Gardner Waller commented that the veterans were well behaved and 
that "their discipline had been of a semi-military nature."81 Commenting on "our recent 
guests," the Roanoke Times called the conduct of 500 traveling Bonus Marchers 
"exemplary and beyond criticism. Aside from . . . feeding and transporting them . . . 
Roanoke had no cause to complain of their presence."82 There were, however, examples 
of troublemakers as well. One veteran "went berserk" in Harrisonburg, was taken into 
custody by local police, and stabbed two inmates with a knife while incarcerated. 83 By 
20 June Lynchburg had 14 veterans in custody for a variety of offenses, three of whom 
attempted to escape and were subsequently assigned to hard labor.84 In Petersburg, Chief 
of Police W.W. Jefferson cautioned residents that men claiming to be veterans were 
going door-to-door asking for money to travel to Washington. Jefferson warned that 
those men who really were veterans had no authorization to solicit funds in this manner, 
while those who were not veterans were using the monies gained for "purposes entirely 
different" from those claimed.85 Despite isolated examples like the above, the overall 
conduct of Bonus Marchers in Virginia was orderly and respectful. 
A constant theme throughout the unprecedented movement of veterans through 
Virginia, men without the means to feed, shelter, or transport themselves, is how 
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consistently absent the state government was from the decision-making process. Local 
authorities were largely left to develop courses of action and fund their execution entirely 
without guidance or assistance from Richmond, despite the fact that authorities in 
Washington were begging Governor Pollard to intervene in order to slow the flood of 
men descending on the capital. That so many men were transported mostly without 
incident in so short a period of time is a testament to the initiative and leadership of a 
number of local officials proactively communicating with each other and taking the steps 
necessary to preserve order in their communities while weathering the storm that had 
rolled in upon them. 
Chapter 5: Blacks and Reds 
The men of the B.E.F. were not always judged solely on the merits of their cause, 
if agreement could even be found as to what their cause was. Tens of thousands of angry 
men swarming the nation's capital had a way of bringing out fear, ignorance, and 
paranoia in some. In the case of the Bonus Army, Southern fears of racial integration and 
national fears of communism combined to take the spotlight off the bonus and put it 
squarely on issues that would drain public sympathy from the veterans' cause. The 
veterans soon discovered that, where public opinion was concerned, it mattered who you 
were and what you thought. 
One of the most striking characteristics of the Bonus Army was that, unlike much 
of the nation, it was racially integrated. It was unprecedented, spontaneous, and neither 
dictated by the force of law nor led by society's elites. Regular men upended the 
conventional wisdom of an entire nation when they crossed racial lines to create the 
B.E.F. in pursuit of their bonus. The American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) in which 
they had served fifteen years earlier had maintained, like much of the nation it served, 
that white and black soldiers could not possibly work together; so much so that black 
soldiers were actually placed in French units rather than alongside their fellow 
Americans.86 That separation didn't exist in the Bonus Army, where black and white 
veterans might be assigned to different squads or platoons, but otherwise marched, 
worked, ate, slept, played, and generally lived together. 
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Virginia in 1932 was no different than most of the American South, where Jim 
Crow "separate but equal" laws were the order of the day. Whites and blacks could not 
sit together on public transportation, eat together in a restaurant, live near each other, be 
educated in the same schools, or worship in a common church. The isolation and 
marginalization of African-Americans was the overriding goal of Southern elites, and as 
long as they could claim it was for everyone's own good, including Southern blacks', Jim 
Crow could stand. The basic incompatibility of whites and blacks was the indispensable 
"truth" without which Jim Crow collapsed. Imagine, then, the shock most white 
Virginians must have felt at the sight of the racially-integrated Bonus Army traveling 
through their state, proving with every step toward Washington the falsehood of so many 
assumptions that were the foundation of a segregated society. The spectacle of white and 
black veterans traveling, sleeping, and eating side by side while working together towards 
a common goal must have been hard for some white Southerners to handle. The Bonus 
Army represented a threat to far more than the federal treasury; it stood the entire Jim 
Crow notion of "separate but equal" on its head. 
Some national observers immediately understood the significance of an integrated 
Bonus Army, though sadly, few of them were white. Most prominent among the black 
correspondents _was Roy Wilkins from the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.), who was astonished to find the degree to which integration 
had taken hold of the veterans at Anacostia. Writing for the N.A.A.C.P.'s magazine 
Crisis, Wilkins informed his readers that, in the B.E.F., "Jim Crow was 'absent without 
41 
leave. "'87 Wilkins went on to make the more dangerous connection between what he was 
seeing at Camp Marks and the hypocrisy of contemporary society. Noting that the U.S. 
Army in which these veterans had served was still segregated, Wilkins observed how "the 
Bonus Marchers gave lie to the notion that black and white soldiers ... couldn't live 
together."88 
While the racial component of the Bonus March was not lost on some national 
writers, it seemed to be completely invisible to the Virginia media. The only hint of 
African-American participation in the Bonus March one will find in any Virginian 
newspaper of the day was the occasional observation that "the group included 50 
negroes" or some such thing. Not one of Virginia's major newspapers recognized the 
significance of the story or, far more likely, they recognized it only too well and 
deliberately ignored it because they didn't much care for its implications for their way of 
life. After all, if white and black men together could form an effective body to petition 
Congress, why couldn't they eat a hamburger together at any Virginia diner? What 
Virginia's media didn't proclaim out loud, its private citizens sometimes did. After the 
veterans were expelled from Washington, Dorsey Cullen ofUpperville, Virginia, wrote to 
Governor Pollard in the hope that the Governor would do everything in his power to 
prevent veterans from loitering in the state. Chief among his reasons for wanting the 
Bonus Army gone was the following: 
While the white men of this organization are not desirable for several reasons, 
what is worse still is the fact that there are numerous Negroes among them which 
would certainly be a source of anxiety and danger to the people here. Their 
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presence here would injure the sale of real estate which is generally moving to the 
demand of those from other States desiring to locate in this rather select and rich 
neighborhood. 89 
What is every bit as amazing as the racist rant that Cullen engaged in is the fact that 
Governor Pollard, in his reply, declined to censure him for it. Instead, he assured Cullen 
that he would do what he could to prevent a "public menace" and asked Cullen to 
continue to keep him informed of developments in Upperville. 90 Paul Dickson, co-author 
of The Bonus Army, understood the racial tensions that were mostly left unsaid when he 
replied to a query about the reason for the cold reception veterans received as they 
traveled through Lynchburg by stating that "race may have played some role in the 
official reaction."91 The dichotomy between the integration of the B.E.F. and the 
segregation of the society it marched through was simply too great not to make the 
probable connection between the veterans' racial integration and the public's hostility to 
their cause. 
In addition to the racial integration of the B.E.F., Virginians may have been 
startled at the sheer number of black veterans marching through the Commonwealth. If 
the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F. is even remotely representative of the B.E.F. as a 
whole, black veterans may have been far more likely to demand their bonus than their 
white counterparts, a fact that would have deeply shaken any support and sympathy that 
Virginians would have otherwise had for the veterans' cause. 
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While no record of the racial demographics of the Richmond contingent of the 
B.E.F. exists, the leadership roles assigned within that group, given the racial climate of 
1932 Virginia, allows us to make some educated assumptions about it. Commander 
Dove divided his veterans into six squads, three of which were assigned black squad 
leaders.92 That he did so could mean one of two things: either he assigned leaders with 
no regard for the race of the men they would lead, or half of the Richmond contingent 
was African-American. It is difficult to imagine that Dove would place white men under 
the command of black squad leaders, however progressive the Bonus Army may have 
seemed to some, so perhaps the Richmonders were about half African-American. Blacks 
accounted for 13 percent of the draftees during the World War, roughly corresponding 
with their percentage of the population as a whole.93 In Virginia blacks accounted for 32 
percent of the population just before the war, and 28 percent just before the Bonus 
March. 94 Assuming then that the percentage of veterans from Virginia who were black 
conformed to their percentage in the general population of the state, as it did nationwide, 
the fact that Dove split his veterans down the middle on a white/black basis suggests that 
African-American veterans, in Virginia at least, were between 60-70 percent more likely 
to participate in the Bonus March than their white peers. Further supporting the 
conclusion that black veterans were more likely to demand early payment of their bonus 
is the fact that, as of 2 June 1932, only four of 163 posts of the Virginia Chapter of the 
American Legion had passed resolutions calling for immediate payment of the bonus, but 
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two of the four were described as "colored posts," although only a small percentage of 
the 163 total posts could have been "colored," given the minority status of black 
Virginians.95 This inclination most likely represents the disparity of the socio-economic 
conditions of white and black America in the midst of the Great Depression, a condition 
that is beyond the scope of the current study. Nevertheless, if the trend can be applied to 
the veterans marching from across the country (and it probably can given the national 
scopes of the Great Depression and African-American socio-economic conditions), the 
B.E.F. may have been over 21 percent black, although the American Expeditionary Force 
was originally only 13 percent black. Couple these numbers with the exemplary manner 
in which the veterans worked side by side for a common cause, and one begins to 
understand the unique threat the B.E.F. represented to the racial status quo, particularly in 
the South. 
Racial composition wasn't the only Bonus Army demographic that was working 
against them. Many observers were concerned about the veterans' real or perceived 
political views as well. In Washington the conviction was beginning to spread through 
the White House, War Department, and other agencies that the Bonus March was nothing 
of the sort, but was rather a communist-inspired manipulation and infiltration of a small 
number of actual veterans, whose purpose was potentially the toppling of the 
government. The Army was especially sensitive to the possibility of a communist plot, 
and General Douglass MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, began to pass detailed 
intelligence reports to the White House highlighting communist influence in groups of 
95 W. Glenn Elliott to John G. Pollard, 2 June 1932, Governor's Papers Collection, Library of 
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veterans en route to Washington. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Justice Department's 
Bureau of Investigation, contributed to the paranoia with regular reports to the White 
House highlighting the communist influence within the B.E.F. It seemed that the 
government was in the grip of a "red scare," convinced that the Great Depression had 
created conditions that made the country vulnerable to a threat from the left. The arrival 
of the Bonus Army intensified these fears among many in Washington, and created a 
potentially volatile situation.96 
Many of Virginia's newspapers bit hard on the supposed communist infiltration of 
Figure 6: One Virginia 
newspaper 's take on the men in 
Washington; are they really 
veterans, or just trying to appear 
so? 
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the B.E.F. story. Across the state papers warned 
the veterans not to allow the "reds' to manipulate 
them, and warned that the use of force may be 
necessary if the B.E.F. couldn't purge its ranks of 
communists. In Richmond, the Times-Dispatch 
didn't want "harm to come to anyone," but 
warned the veterans that they must cleanse 
themselves of all radicals and not become ''the 
dupes of communists" if they wanted to avoid a 
confrontation. 97 Two days later it cautioned the 
veterans again not to become the "dupes" of the 
communist "shock troops" in their midst.98 The 
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Lynchburg Daily Advance contended in three editorials that the veterans were losing 
control of their protest to groups of communists, and that they had better do something 
about it before the government did.99 
Newspapers weren't the only source of red baiting in Virginia. Elites from all 
sectors of society jumped on the red bandwagon, perhaps none more prominent than 
General Billy Mitchell. General Mitchell had pioneered the use of military aircraft 
during and after World War I, and had been famously court-martialed for embarrassing 
the Navy by sinking capital ships with torpedo planes in a post-war demonstration during 
which he deliberately disobeyed direct orders to limit the size of the bombs his planes 
dropped. 100 By 1932 he had been mostly vindicated in his views on the utility of military 
aircraft, and was living in Middleburg, Virginia, about 50 miles outside Washington. His 
status gave him access to the Governor, and he used it to blast away at what he was sure 
was a communist plot to overthrow the federal government. General Mitchell assured 
Governor Pollard that he understood, through his contacts in the American Legion and 
the Army, that the entire Bonus March was planned and directed by the Communist Party 
in New York. Phase one of their plan, Mitchell claimed, was to march on Washington 
under the Bonus Certificate pretense with the goal of being forcibly thrown out, while 
phase two would establish a national movement with the goal of toppling the federal 
government, funds for which were being provided by the Soviet Union. Mitchell urged 
Pollard to therefore take a hard line with the veterans, prevent them from "squatting" in 
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Virginia, and be vigilant in countering the communistic drumbeat that was sure to 
accompany phase two of their plan to bring down the govemment. 101 
The government and the press needn't have worried about a communist 
revolution, at least not from the veterans in Washington. There were communists in the 
ranks of the B.E.F., but their numbers were small and, careful not to give the government 
any reason to start anything, the B.E.F. did an exemplary job of ridding itself of 
communist agitators throughout the Bonus March. From the very beginning, Walter 
Waters went out of his way to assure the authorities that the B.E.F. would not tolerate 
communists in their midst, then put out orders to his men to tum any communists out of 
their ranks aggressively. Told by Chief Glassford that they were welcome in Washington 
as long as they behaved like gentlemen and didn't mix with communists, one Bonus 
Marcher replied that "if we find any 'red' agitators we'll take care of them ourselves."102 
Take care of them they did. Suspected communists were tried by B.E.F. courts for 
spreading communist literature and whipped as a result, denied rations and shelter, and 
some even suspected a couple of communists fished out of the Potomac had been beaten 
to death by Bonus March~rs. 103 Virginia's own veterans took their cue from the larger 
Bonus Army and did whatever they could to discourage any association with 
communists. At their very first meeting in Richmond, R.J. Pacini from the V.F.W. 
addressed the men and warned them against mixing with any communists they might 
encounter in Washington. Calling them the "greatest threat to our country at the present 
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time," Pacini encouraged the Richmonders to "just bust them in the nose" if approached 
by communists. 104 Veterans passing through the state echoed those sentiments. In 
Roanoke reporters discovered that no "red" talk was being tolerated by a group of 500 
veterans from Texas and Oklahoma, and they had just expelled two of their own in 
Memphis for engaging in exactly that. 105 Again and again, transient veterans and 
recruiters were asked by reporters about the communist presence in their ranks, only to be 
told, as Ben Miller told the Richmond Times-Dispatch while selling copies of the B.E.F. 
News in Richmond, "we allow no 'reds' around our camps."106 No amount of hard 
evidence could ever convince the government or Virginia's press that what Miller 
asserted was true. Convinced there was a threat which simply didn't exist, at least not on 
the scale it imagined, Washington inched closer and closer to confronting the B.E.F. 
Americans' fear of communists and nationwide racial tensions would continue for 
decades after the Bonus Army was largely forgotten, until the end of the Cold War and 
the passage of civil rights legislation drove those fears to the back burner or underground. 
Although it may have hurt their cause in the short run, the demographics of the B.E.F. 
may have borne unintended fruit as well. If nothing else, the Bonus Army would force 
some thoughtful Virginians to consider the injustice of Jim Crow and perhaps their own 
hypocrisy. Whatever some white Virginians thought of the African-Americans in their 
midst, black veterans had no doubt where they stood, or at least intended to stand. Later, 
as the Bonus Army was being routed from downtown Washington by American troops, a 
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black veteran, badly stabbed in the melee, plainly stated what any Virginian veteran, 
white or black, on the wrong side of U.S. Army bayonets would have felt when he 
exclaimed "I may not be an American, but I'm a Virginian."107 
107 Dickson and Allen, p. 178. 
Chapter 6: "Until We Change The Minds of These Guys" 
On 15 June 1932, the House voted 209-176 in favor of paying the Soldiers' Bonus 
immediately and entirely. Of Virginia's ten Congressmen only Representative John W. 
Flannagan of the 9th District (Bristol), who had also signed the veterans' petition pulling 
the bill out of committee, voted in favor. In Richmond, the News Leader was proud that 
no other state voted against the bill with so large a percentage of its strength, but was 
nonetheless "humiliated" by the single "yes" vote of Representative Flannagan. Indeed, 
the News Leader urged its readers to remove him and any other pro-bonus politicians 
from office at the earliest opportunity. 108 The Richmond Times-Dispatch urged 
Virginians to be proud of the votes of their Representatives, and assured its readers that 
the bill would not pass in the Senate.109 The Lynchburg Daily Advance blasted the House 
for "passing the buck" to the Senate, and hoped the Senate would not do the same thing 
to the President. 110 In Norfolk, the Virginian-Pilot scolded the House for taking action 
that would only encourage other disgruntled groups to travel to Washington to march for 
their myriad causes and, confident that the veterans would disperse as soon as their 
legislation was killed, urged the Senate to "get on with the execution."111 Although the 
Roanoke Times was disappointed in the House, it was so certain that the Senate would 
vote the Patman Bill down that it began to write about the Bonus March in the past tense, 
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blaming the entire affair on politicians who encouraged the veterans to travel to 
Washington for a bonus they never had any chance of actually rcceiving. 112 
Three days later the Senate took up the Patman Bill. Already working past the 
end of the current Congressional tenn, it would be the last act of the 72nd Congress. 
While thousands of veterans kept vigil on the Capitol la\\TI, Senators debated into the 
night, not entirely certain what the B.E.F. would do if they voted against the bonus. At 
9:30 P.M. word was sent to Walter Waters that the Senate had defeated the bill 62-18, 
with 16 not voting. 113 Senator Carter Glass (D-VA) voted against the bill, while Senator 
Claude Swanson (D-V A) did not vote but was paired against the bill, as he was attending 
the Geneva Annament Limitation Conference at the request of President Hoover, and 
therefore had the good fortune, according to the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, of being "three 
thousand miles removed from Washington's unholy mess." 114 While stunned veterans 
absorbed the news outside, frightened senators made good their escapes through 
underground tunnels so as not to face the crowd or be in the building if the veterans 
should stonn it, though nothing of the sort happened. 115 
Virginia's newspapers unanimously cheered the results of the vote in the Senate. 
The Lynchburg Daily Advance congratulated the Senate for taking a "courageous stand'' 
by removing another obstacle to comprehensive economic recovery, while at the same 
time congratulating the B.E.F. for the manner in which it "received the blow."116 The 
Richmond Times-Dispatch suggested that the Senate's vote was a stinging rebuke of the 
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House of Representatives, and that even responsible Bonus Marchers would look back 
one day with no pride on their protest and recognize the Senate had done the right thing 
by the nation.117 The Richmond News Leader thought the six-year terms Senators 
enjoyed made it easier for them to stand up to special interests, and suggested that the 
nation might look at longer terms for Representatives in order to "stiffen the backbone" 
of that chamber as well. 118 The Farmville Herald was just happy to see the current 
Congressional session finally come to an end. Disgusted with the overall performance of 
this particular Congress, the Herald suggested it would be forever known "for bad 
legislation that failed, rather than for good legislation which passed," no doubt referring 
in part to the Patman Bill which was the final piece of "bad legislation" to fail. 119 
In the wake of the Senate's rejection of the Patman Bill, Virginia began to grapple 
with the problem of what to do with potentially thousands of veterans stranded within her 
borders. Most veterans had no more means of getting home than they had to get to 
Washington in the first place. Assuming, as most did, that the B.E.F. would disintegrate 
shortly after the "no" vote in the Senate, Virginia State Adjutant General S. Gardner 
Waller rushed to Washington to meet with officials there regarding how best to ensure 
the veterans did not linger long in the area. Washington Police Chief Glassford told him 
that the District would transport veterans to the Virginia and Maryland borders, and 
suggested that Virginia supply trucks to take them from there, stating that Maryland had 
already agreed to do so. This Waller refused to do, explaining that the distances in 
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Virginia were much greater than those in Maryland, making the cost of transporting 
thousands of men across his state far too high. No evidence is available that Waller ever 
requested assistance from the federal government in moving veterans through Virginia. 
At one point Waller suggested that he may have to appeal to citizens to carry veterans a 
couple at a time through Virginia in their private automobiles. Lacking the funds or 
vehicles to do anything else, he waited to see what developed and hoped the numbers of 
men traveling home through his state would be low. 120 
Waller needn't have worried too much about plans to move the veterans because, 
to the surprise of most observers, the veterans had decided they weren't going anywhere. 
While the morning after the vote in the Senate the Richmond Times-Dispatch called the 
pursuit of immediate payment a "dead issue" and declared that the veterans were now 
"retracing their steps homeward," nothing could have been further from the truth. 121 The 
very next day the Richmond News leader observed that few if any veterans had been 
seen passing through Richmond on their way home as expected, and railroad officials had 
not yet been inundated with veterans riding their trains. 122 Although many did leave 
Washington after the Senate vote, Walter Waters immediately announced that the entire 
B.E.F. intended to stay "until we change the minds of these guys," until 1945 if 
necessary, when their bonuses were legally due to be paid. 123 While many veterans gave 
up hope and started for home, the bulk of them stayed on, including most of the 
Richmond contingent. Joined by a second wave of 35 Richmond veterans two days after 
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the first group arrived, by early July Virginia's veterans had moved from their initial 
camp located at Congress Heights to 4 Yi Street and Main A venue. Their choice of 
location not only put them outside Anacostia, but placed· them away from the main 
concentration of veterans in the city located along Pennsylvania A venue between the 
White House and the Capitol, where clashes with police in the coming days would soon 
initiate the veterans' expulsion from Washington. 124 The Virginians' location placed 
them adjacent to the old U.S. Army War College, before it was moved to Pennsylvania, 
where ironically officers were probably in the midst of discussions about how to suppress 
the very protest taking place outside their gates. 
Shortly after settling on 4 Yi Street the Virginians moved for a second and final 
time to Camp Bartlett, just outside the District borders east of Camps Marks and Sims at 
Anacostia. Camp Bartlett was named after John H. Bartlett, a former Governor of New 
Hampshire who was sympathetic to the veterans' cause. Bartlett owned some wooded 
land in a secluded area just outside the District of Columbia and donated it to Walter 
Waters for use as a B.E.F. camp. In what would become home to 1,200 veterans, Camp 
Bartlett was one of the more civilized bonus camps, with Army tents, electricity, and a 
couple of kitchens. 125 In addition to having many comforts lacking in other B.E.F. 
camps, Camp Bartlett promised to be something of a safe haven for the veterans should 
things turn confrontational between the Bonus Army and the government, since it was 
both outside the District of Columbia and on private land. While the camp's location 
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meant a longer walk for veterans to get to the center of the action at the Capitol, its 
comfortable facilities and supposed safety were probably worth the trouble for many. 
An indication of the necessities as well as the boredom of camp life can be seen in 
the list of items the Richmonders requested through the Times-Dispatch on at least two 
occasions: "blankets, cots, clothing, shoes, cigarettes, pipe and chewing tobacco, 
matches, magazines, boxing gloves, checker boards and any other games," as well as 
plenty of food and money. 126 The proximity of Virginia's veterans to their home state 
meant that supplies from home were plentiful compared to those from further away, so 
much so that Walter Waters began to centralize collection of all donations in order to 
distribute the goods evenly across the entire B.E.F. This had the unintended side effect of 
encouraging Virginians and others in nearby states to stop sending donations altogether 
"if (their) own boys can't keep it!"127 
The Richmond B.E.F. was constantly looking to secure additional men as well as 
supplies. B.E.F. recruiters scoured Richmond, Hopewell, Petersburg, and the 
surrounding area throughout June and July, looking for veterans to join the Richmond 
contingent at Camp Bartlett.128 An indication of Virginia's proximity and importance to 
the B.E.F. may have been that the very first of many recruiters that Waters sent out after 
the Senate vote was a Wisconsin woman he dispatched to Richmond. 129 Their efforts 
seem to have only seldom paid dividends. Some citizens claimed the veterans were 
recruiting not only other veterans, but any unemployed men as well. In early July a 
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single truckload of recruits for the Richmond B.E.F. left town for Camp Bartlett. It was 
the only documented example of success in their recruiting drive, and it couldn't have 
included more than 30 to 40 veterans. 130 
One important member of the Richmond B.E.F. was no longer with the outfit after 
the Senate vote. By 22 June C.C. Grotz, previously 2nd in command, had been elevated 
to commander of the Richmond B.E.F. 131 Thomas B. Dove is named as the commander 
by the Times-Dispatch as late as 13 June, which placed him with the unit in Alexandria, 
about to move to Congress Heights. It is clear, then, that Dove was not part of the initial 
100 or so Richmonders who slipped away after the setback with rail transportation on the 
first night, and that he made the trip north. On 15 and 18 June the House and Senate 
voted on the Patman Bill, and by 22 June Grotz is confirmed to be in charge, making it 
likely that Dove was one of the many who went home dejected after the Senate voted 
down the bonus. It is possible that something more dramatic happened, that he was 
forced out or otherwise resigned as a result of some incident, but the total lack of 
newspaper coverage accounting for the change in leadership seems to support a less 
remarkable exit. At any rate, given his previously-mentioned perceptible lack of 
leadership ability, it was probably no great loss. 
As the camps in and around Washington grew ever larger, the health implications 
of their existence began to concern Virginia's State Health Commissioner Dr. Warren F. 
Draper. Comparing the conditions of the various camps to those at Camp Thomas at 
Chickamauga during the Spanish American War where 15 percent of the assigned 
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soldiers developed typhoid fever, Draper urged Virginian veterans to stay away from the 
camps "unless they should feel the urge of a real duty."132 Sanitation was every bit as 
bad as Draper feared. Flies, mosquitoes, garbage in the streets, and hasty latrines created 
appalling conditions. Food was mishandled and improperly stored, was not always fully 
cooked, and was eaten with filthy hands off makeshift plates passed from veteran to 
veteran. Many rummaged through trash heaps looking for anything to build shelter with, 
some lived with no shelter at all, and clothes were washed and men bathed in the river. 133 
Dr. Draper wasn't the only one concerned about the unhealthy conditions in the 
veterans' camps. The day after Draper's warning the Lynchburg Daily Advance 
completely agreed with him, urging Virginia's veterans to heed the doctor's advice and 
not travel to Washington, and took his warning a step further. The Daily Advance wasn't 
only worried about the health of the men in the camps, but was starting to think about the 
implications for the state if thousands of sick men eventually had to pass through the 
small towns of Virginia on their way home, spreading disease throughout. 134 A few days 
later the federal government began to address some of Virginia's concerns by opening a 
field hospital for ill Bonus Marchers at Fort Hunt, south of Alexandria. At a cost of 
$10,000, it had 46 beds and stocked more food than most Bonus Marchers could probably 
imagine. As of 18 June there were only twelve men admitted, and the epidemic that 
. h . l' d 135 many expected mt e B.E.F. camps never matena 1ze . 
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The B.E.F. was competing for attention with a lot of news items in the summer of 
1932. Virginia's papers were dominated with Hitler's rise in Germany, the debate on 
prohibition, the Democratic Convention in Chicago, the kidnapping and murder of 
Charles Lindbergh's son, and a reunion of Confederate veterans in Richmond. Despite 
the busy news season, Virginians were extremely interested in the veterans' march to 
their north. Besides the coverage they received on the front pages and editorial sections 
of Virginia's newspaper, the veterans published their own newspaper, the B.E.F. News, 
which was sold throughout Northern Virginia and on the streets of Richmond. By July 
1932 circulation of the veterans' paper had reached 100,000 copies a week. 136 
The University of Virginia's Institute on Public Affairs was interested enough in 
the Bonus March to commission a round table event on the topic of unemployment, and 
invited B.E.F. Commander Walter Waters to address the forum. 137 Waters accepted, but 
on 11 July it was his Chief of Staff, Captain Doak E. Carter, who appeared in 
Charlottesville. Carter told the panel that the veterans were not in Washington to secure 
immediate payment of the bonus, but rather to guard American institutions from 
communists or any other group threatening to overthrow the government. The 
Lynchburg Daily Advance pointed out that it surely would have come as a shock to the 
25,000 men flying banners demanding payment of their bonus that their real purpose was 
not to receive their money at all, but rather to protect the government that wasn't giving it 
to them. 138 
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As June gave way to July and the B.E.F. continued to linger in Washington, 
Virginia's press called loudly and often for the veterans to return home. From the day the 
Senate defeated the Patman Resolution until the Army evicted them from Washington, 
the Richmond Times-Dispatch called on the veterans to disperse no fewer than six times 
in editorials entitled "A Dead Issue," "This Should End It," "Time to Demobilize," 
"Veterans Go Home!," "No Time for Bluster," and "A Bonus Concession." When 
Confederate veterans met for a reunion in Richmond that summer, the Roanoke Times 
recounted the hardships those men endured upon returning home from the Civil War and 
commented that "no man waited for a bonus, or expected anything of an act of 
Congress." The veterans of an older war, they thought, had something to teach the 
veterans of a newer one. 139 The Lynchburg Daily Advance, feeling that the veterans were 
only adding to their suffering by staying in their dilapidated camps long after all hope of 
securing their money had faded away, urged them to disband. 140 Letters to the Editor 
occasionally added to the chorus of voices demanding an end to the Bonus March, such 
as one particularly angry letter to the Richmond Times-Dispatch from A Virginia Voter, 
who claimed the federal government could learn from Mussolini, who had just had two 
would-be-assassins executed: "Stop molly-coddling. Stop nursing men who are enemies 
h I d f h. h . . .1 ,,141 to our country. Arrest t e ea ers o t is group ... put t em m Jal .
The Roanoke Times' admiration for the veterans of the Civil War may shed some 
light on the mood of the Commonwealth towards the entire adjusted compensation issue. 
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Right in the middle of the Bonus March in Washington, Confederate veterans gathered in 
Richmond and struck a dramatic contrast to the veterans in Washington. Most of 
Virginia's Civil War veterans would have been content with nothing but victory in their 
war, yet this new breed of soldier, victorious in their war, demanded money in addition to 
victory. For many Virginians it probably went to the heart of what military service 
should be in a free republic. It was supposed to be the soldier's honor to serve, not the 
nation's honor to have the soldier. Sure, veterans were hurting, but in the middle of the 
Great Depression everyone was suffering, and the World War I veterans surely didn't 
think the current economic conditions were worse than those Virginia's Civil War 
veterans experienced. Consider too that after the Civil War the federal government 
granted pensions to Northern veterans as early as 1862, but left Southern veterans to their 
individual states. 142 Virginia didn't offer its veterans pensions until 1888, and then at 
much lower rates than in the North. 143 Later efforts to incorporate Confederate veterans 
into the United States pension system were unsuccessful, which only pushed Virginians 
further away from Washington. One is left to wonder if two distinct military cultures 
emerged from the Civil War: one that took victory for granted and expected veterans to 
be well compensated, the other that hoped for victory and expected little material help 
win or lose. If that be the case, it could be a partial explanation of how the 
preponderance of the national press might .be sympathetic to the Bonus Army, yet 
Virginians might have nothing but disdain for it. 
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Chapter 7: Exit Strategies 
Virginia's newspaper editorial boards weren't the only ones who thought it might 
be time for the veterans to return home. As Jennings C. Wise had discovered, many in 
the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F. were beginning to feel the same way. Wise was 
an Army officer, lawyer, and author who in the summer of 1932 was associated with the 
law firm of Dunn, Anderson, and Dunn in Washington, D.C. As a native Virginian, he 
made it his business to seek out his fellow Virginian veterans when they came to town for 
their bonus. What he discovered was that many of the Virginians wanted to return home, 
but didn't do so for lack of transportation and food. Wise became convinced that if one 
group started for home, others would follow their lead, until eventually the whole of the 
B.E.F. had departed from the city. Determined that it should be the Virginians that led 
the way, Wise contacted his old acquaintance, Governor Pollard. Wise and Pollard had 
worked together previously at the firm of Pollard, Wise, and Chichester in Richmond. 
Wise hoped that he might call upon that previous association to secure the Governor's 
cooperation with his plan. In a phone call to the Governor in early July, Wise explained 
that he had met the Richmond contingent in Washington and that they had asked him to 
serve as their commander.144 This is entirely plausible, as Wise was a Virginian and had 
himself served as a Lieutenant Colonel in the A.E.F. during the war, and the time frame 
roughly coincides with the disappearance of Thomas Dove as the Virginians' 
commander. Wise claimed he turned them down, yet began to build up support within 
the ranks of the Richmond contingent for dissolution of the B.E.F. 




Wise contacted the Governor by phone to propose a course of action while the 
latter was attending the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Wise briefed 
Pollard on the growing discontent in the Richmond contingent, informed him that he had 
taken the liberty of arranging press coverage of the Virginians' retreat with the 
Associated and United Press, and asked the Governor for transportation and provisions 
for the veterans. Judging by the tone of a letter of explanation Wise later sent Pollard, the 
conversation did not go well. Whatever Wise's intentions, Pollard seems to have 
suspected they were self-serving, and may have told him as much, because Wise sought 
to assure Pollard after the fact that his only motive was to help bring the Bonus March to 
a conclusion, and that his actions had "no political implications as far as (he) was 
concerned."145 From Pollard's perspective, Wise's initiative probably risked making the 
Governor look a bit indecisive by comparison, particularly because Wise had already laid 
on press coverage, and Pollard would therefore not have the opportunity to influence the 
story. By endorsing Wise's plan at this late stage Pollard risked allowing real leadership 
to be demonstrated by someone other than himself, triumphantly concluding the most 
vexing problem facing the national government at the moment. 
Since Governor Pollard declined Wise's request, an opportunity for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia to bring the Bonus March to a peaceful conclusion was 
missed. Still, even if he agreed to provide trucks and food, Wise's plan may have come 
to nothing. Two days after Wise contacted Pollard in Chicago, Walter Waters and the 
rest of the leadership of the Bonus Army learned about the planned exodus of the 
145 Wise to Pollard, 12 July 1932. 
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Virginians. Waters moved quickly to crush the revolt by sending men among the 
Richmond contingent threatening violence should they break ranks. In the face of these 
threats and absent any support from their home state the men complied, and the Bonus 
March dragged on into the summer toward what kind of resolution nobody knew. 
As the Bonus March wore on into July, the federal government began to look for 
some way to bring the affair to a conclusion. Recognizing that wishing the veterans away 
wouldn't make it so, on 7 July Congress authorized payment of $100,000 to Bonus 
Marchers to pay their way home. Although the payout would count against the value of 
the Bonus Certificate of any veteran who accepted, the Richmond Times-Dispatch still 
thought it regrettable that this money, which might have been better used to ease 
suffering elsewhere, should be spent on the veterans. Nevertheless, it acknowledged that 
Congress had to do something to remove them from Washington, and strongly urged all 
Bonus Marchers to take the money and go home. 146 
General Glassford, who was forever touring the B.E.F. camps on his motorcycle 
to check on the men and oversee the distribution of supplies, also urged veterans to 
accept the government-provided tickets and return home. Glassford worked the crowd 
himself, but also treated the veterans to concerts by military bands, whose programs were 
designed to remind the men of home and entice them to return there. Among other songs 
from all parts of the country, "Carry Me Back to Old Virginny" was a regular part of any 
concert in the veterans' camps. 147 By 11 July, 1,100 veterans had taken advantage of the 
"free" tickets home, although just as many replacements had poured into Washington in 
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that time, and some of those traveling home were discovered to be B.E.F. recruiters, 
traveling to cities far and near to recruit additional veterans to join their ranks in 
Washington.148 
Having failed to end the standoff with tickets home, the government prepared to 
meet the veterans half way on their demand for full payment of the bonus. On 21 July 
President Hoover signed legislation that authorized any veteran to borrow up to 50 
percent of the value of their Adjusted Compensation Certificates. Previously no veteran 
with a certificate less than two years old could borrow against it, and the new rules also 
lowered the interest on loans from 4 Yz percent to 3 Yz percent. 149 The Richmond Times-
Dispatch praised the act as another in a series of concessions made to the veterans by an 
extremely reasonable government and renewed its call for the veterans to take advantage 
of this generosity and leave Washington.1so A previous act of 1930 had allowed veterans 
to borrow against their certificates on less liberal terms, but this new law made an 
additional 4,000 Virginian veterans eligible to borrow their bonus money. The Virginian 
branch of the United States Veterans Bureau estimated that those 4,000 veterans might 
borrow up to $2.2 million, and prepared to issue checks immediately. 1s1 On the first day 
applications were to be taken for the new loans approximately 400 Virginians applied for 
and received 50 percent of the value of their Bonus Certificates, with half the total 
coming from Richmond. The vast majority of applications were expected to be received 
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by mail in the days that followed. 152 It was hoped that with free tickets home and half 
their bonus money in their pockets, the veterans of the B.E.F. would finally disperse. If 
they didn't, President Hoover's frustration was beginning to grow to the point where he 
was willing to consider more radical options for dealing with the problem. 
The large number of veterans who came out of the woodwork to borrow against 
their certificates makes one wonder why they were not supporting their fellow veterans in 
Washington. After all, Virginia only had about 300 soldiers in the Richmond B.E.F. 
camp at any one time, and traveling there represented a fraction of the effort it would 
have taken a veteran from the western states, given Virginia's proximity. The number of 
Virginian veterans who. came forward to borrow money only serves to call attention to 
the number who chose not to call on the government for immediate and full payment of 
their bonus, and suggests that even Virginian veterans did not necessarily fully support 
the Patman Bill. 
In the midst of all this posturing and back and forth over whether the government 
would provide for the veterans and whether the veterans would accept anything short of 
full payment of the bonus, a seemingly inconsequential blurb was published in the 
Richmond News Leader that should have given the veterans pause. On 21 July, the paper 
reported that a shipment of tear gas guns and grenades had left Pittsburgh for 
W h. 153 as mgton. 
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Chapter 8: Plan \Vhitc 
Blockaded in the White House by thousands of veterans and fearing a growing 
perception of weakness during an election year, by the middle of July President Hoover 
had had quite enough of the Bonus Marchers. Inundated with intelligence reports that 
insisted the Bonus Army was teeming with radicals, and having tried and failed to pay 
their travel expenses home and loan them half of their bonus money to placate them, 
Hoover determined to use force instead. Unwilling to wait any longer for a compromise 
solution, Hoover ordered the District Police to evict the veterans from the buildings they 
had occupied for two months along Pennsylvania Avenue. On 27 July, Walter Waters 
was informed that his men would have to evacuate said buildings by 1 August. Waters 
intended to comply, and even planned to relocate the men affected to Camp Bartlett with 
John H. Bartlett's blessing, but when he appeared before them that afternoon to ask for 
their cooperation the men refused to give it. If the area was to be cleared, the veterans 
would have to be compelled to leave. 154 
On the morning of 28 July the District Police began to clear the B.E.F. from 
downtown Washington. Everything went well for the first couple hours until veterans 
from outlying camps began to arrive downtown to challenge the eviction. Daniels quotes 
a police officer on the scene as reporting that the B.E.F. reinforcements came from the 
direction of 4 ~ Street and Main Avenue, which at one time was roughly the location of 
the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F., but by late July those men were out at Camp 
Bartlett. Given the speed with which events unfolded, it is unlikely that the Virginians 
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could have arrived downtown quickly enough to either cause or participate in the riot that 
ensued. At any rate, shouts escalated to shoves, and then to thrown bricks, and finally 
bullets when a District Police Officer shot and killed one Bonus Marcher and wounded a 
second. 155 Once the White House became convinced that the police had lost control of 
the situation, the War Department was told to clear the entire downtown of veterans 
immediately. 
The Army had first considered the problem of defending the city of Washington 
against American civilians in the 1920s, culminating in the publication of Plan White. 
Declassified in 1974, Plan White envisioned a communist rabble attempting to overthrow 
the U.S. Government by force, a very real fear post-Russian Revolution and one that 
corresponded with the government's characterization of the B.E.F. In the 1930s the 
continental United States was divided into nine corps areas by the War Department, each 
of which was responsible for monitoring "subversive activities" in its respective area. 
The III Corps area included Virginia and the District of Columbia, in addition to 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and parts of West Virginia. Given its geographical area of 
responsibility, the production of Plan White fell to III Corps. III Corps Commanders had 
identified key industries and assets within its area of responsibility and envisioned 
civilian threats to Washington as coming primarily from foreign-born radicals in the 
cities of Pennsylvania and Maryland. African Americans in Richmond were mentioned 
as a possible source of agitation, but were brushed aside as not posing the most likely 
threat to the government. III Corps revisions of Plan White predicted that subversive 
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activity would begin with an information campaign designed to undermine the loyalty of 
local and federal police and military forces, followed by widespread strikes affecting 
important industries, and leading finally to the seizure of strategic facilities and assets. 
While III Corps had assumed disgruntled workers, and not veterans would lead any 
attempt at revolution, from III Corps' prospective the Bonus March looked a lot like the 
first phase of how its Plan White predicted a revolution would begin, with an information 
campaign designed to shake the loyalty of government forces. 156 
In accordance with the general outline of Plan White, the War Department had 
been moving assets in and around Washington for two months in anticipation of the order 
it now received. A Marine detachment at Quantico, Virginia, had been under orders to be 
prepared to defend Washington since the second week of June.157 Fort Myer, Virginia, 
had been the site of anti-riot training since at least that early. Home to the Army's 3rd 
Cavalry of which Major George S. Patton Jr. was the executive officer, the officers and 
men of that famed unit had been confined to post and busy trading places as rioters and 
soldiers, conducting rehearsals for what many assumed would soon be the real thing.158 
In addition to positioning and training troops, six tanks had been brought in from 
Maryland and a large number of trucks had been positioned around Washington to 
quickly move troops to the site of riots in the capital. 
General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, took personal command 
of the operation, with his aide Major Dwight D. Eisenhower at his side. Troops from 
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Fort Myer, including Major Patton with his 3rd Cavalry, trucked to Washington through 
Arlington National Cemetery and assembled near the White House, while ships carrying 
infantrymen from Fort Washington 18-miles downriver disembarked near the Army War 
College. At 4:30 in the afternoon, shortly after the arrival of the tanks from Fort Myer, 
the Army began its sweep through downtown. With bayonets fixed and gas masks on, 
soldiers drove veterans from the buildings they occupied with tear gas and the stocks of 
their rifles. Although some veterans threw bricks or stones, most retreated in the face of 
the soldiers, and by that evening downtown Washington was mostly cleared of veterans 
with no additional loss of life. 159 
General MacArthur's orders were to clear downtown of veterans, and he was 
specifically told not to pursue the veterans into their outlying camps. Nevertheless, after 
a well executed clearing operation downtown, MacArthur moved his men to the 11th 
Street Bridge opposite Anacostia and prepared to disperse the Bonus Army from their 
main camp. Reminded late on the 28th by a messenger from the White House that the 
President did not wish him to enter the veterans' camp, MacArthur replied that he was "at 
war," and did not have time for anyone "pretending to bring orders," then ordered his 
men into Anacostia. Once there his troops drove the veterans out, again making liberal 
use of tear gas, expelling the men from what had been their homes. Troops then burned 
the entire camp to the ground, wrapping up the operation by midnight. 160 Demonstrating 
a media savvy that was second to none, MacArthur concluded his operation by pre-
empting any presidential censure for overstepping his bounds by conducting an on-the-
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spot midnight press conference during which he praised the President's decision 
authorizing him to rout the veterans out of their main camps, assuring the nation that had 
Hoover not done so, the consequences would have been dire indeed. 161 Faced with his 
General's media coup, the President could publicly call the Army Chief of Staff a liar, or 
accept the responsibility MacArthur had thrust upon him. Hoover chose not to contradict 
MacArthur, leaving the former to shoulder the legacy of turning bayonets on hungry men, 
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Figure 7: B.E.F. camps and the locations of Virginia 's veteran; June-July 1932. 
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When the dust settled on the morning of 29 July the Richmond B.E.F. was still on 
the outskirts of the District of Columbia at Camp Bartlett. Having been bypassed in the 
Army's sweep of the city the night before, and billeted on private rather than federal land, 
they probably felt confident that the worst was over. Late in the morning of the 29th, 
however, the Army finally arrived to drive them out as well. John Henry Bartlett, owner 
of the land on which Camp Bartlett was located and until that time unswerving friend to 
the veterans, had unexpectedly withdrawn his permission for the B.E.F. to encamp on his 
property, leading to the presence of federal troops there. 162 Shortly after agreeing to 
Walter Waters' plan to evacuate Washington in favor of Camp Bartlett, John Bartlett 
began to sense that the Administration would not approve. In 1932 Bartlett was President 
Hoover's First Assistant Postmaster General, and after a short period of reflection he 
concluded that he could not endanger his standing with the President by sheltering the 
B.E.F. on his land if the President should wish otherwise. One day before the eviction, 
and with no prior knowledge of what was to come, Bartlett penned a letter to Glassford 
informing him that the veterans were welcome to stay on his land only so long as the 
government consented. 163 Two days later the government no longer consented, and the 
troops arrived on Bartlett's land. The Army quickly pushed 1,500 veterans out of Camp 
Bartlett and by that evening the men of the Richmond contingent were either heading for 
home or trying to find what was left of the B.E.F. 164 
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Given the veterans' rough treatment at the hands of the Army one might expect 
the Virginia press to reevaluate its position on the Bonus March. According to Paul 
Dickson, co-author of The Bonus Army, most anti-bonus newspapers around the country 
did just that. 165 Newspapers across Virginia, however, were nearly as hard on the 
veterans as ever. The Richmond News Leader claimed that even "habitual 
sentimentalists" would not be able to make heroes of the men injured in the raid on the 




Figure 8: While Virginia 's 
newspapers agreed that the 
expulsion was necessary, even 
"inevitable, " most regretted it all 
the same. 
been allowed in the capital in the first place. 166 
Across town, the Times-Dispatch took a more 
reasonable tone. Sorry that it had come to 
violence, they grieved for those whose blood had 
been shed, but reiterated their support for the 
government, stating that a clash had become 
necessary and unavoidable, as the nation could no 
longer endure defiance of the law on such a 
scale. 167 The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot was frankly 
surprised that violence hadn't erupted sooner, and 
expressed the hope that the President had done the 
right thing by routing the veterans out of their 
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camps, but suggested that "only time would tell."168 In Lynchburg the Daily Advance 
called the government's action "necessary," stating that the B.E.F. had been permitted to 
lobby their lawmakers and lost, but implored the nation to set about to fixing the 
problems that had driven these men to such desperation in the first place. 169 
Charlottesville's Daily Progress regretted that the veterans hadn't been dealt with more 
firmly from the beginning, as it might have made the events of 29 July unnecessary. All 
things considered, however, the paper was resolute that President Hoover had acted 
correctly, stating that it was "obviously (his) final duty to ... restore order."170 
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Chapter 9: Virginia's Problem Now 
For the first time since the veterans began pouring through Virginia in early June, 
Governor Pollard acted decisively to shape events. On the evening of 28 July, while 
General MacArthur was crossing the 11th Street Bridge to bum the B.E.F. out of 
Anacostia, Pollard met with State Adjutant General S. Gardner Waller and Director of the 
State Motor Vehicle Division T. McCall Frazier to issue instructions for handling the 
crisis. Pollard had decided that he could not allow in August a reverse of June, when 
thousands of veterans had stampeded through Virginia on their way to Washington. He 
therefore instructed Waller and Frazier to depart immediately for Alexandria with orders 
to permit only small groups of veterans with means to transport and feed themselves to 
pass through Virginia. All others were to be turned around, by force if necessary, and 
sent back into the District of Columbia. 171 
Waller and Frazier left Richmond that evening around midnight by car, and at 3 
AM. arrived in Alexandria to convey the Governor's instructions to Arlington County 
Sheriff Howard B. Fields and Alexandria Chief of Police Arnold. While Frazier was 
present to ensure none of the veterans lingered in Virginia and was prepared to use every 
agency at his disposal to keep them on the move, Waller remained to call out and take 
charge of local units of the National Guard, should the need arise. 172 Frazier had ordered 
75 of his state troopers north with tear gas and riot guns, and by 4 A.M. men were in 
place guarding all of the bridges and roads that led into Virginia from Washington, with 
171 T. McCall Frazier to John G. Pollard, 3 August 1932, Governor's Papers Collection, Library of 
Virginia. 
172 
"Bonus Men Quit Camp Near Here," Alexandria Gazette, 29 July 1932, p. 1. 
74 
75 
additional men scouring the countryside for roaming veterans who had already slipped 
through.173 It wasn't long before they found some. At 5:30 A.M. Frazier led a group of 
troopers to a campsite of recently expelled Bonus Marchers just outside the Alexandria 
city limits. Numbering about 350, they could have created a great deal of trouble for the 
authorities, but after a short conference and a chance to eat breakfast, they formed up and 
peacefully marched back into the District of Columbia. Smaller groups were rounded up 
and pushed across the state line into Washington throughout the morning, and one 
contingent was supplied with guides to lead them through Washington to Rockville, 
Maryland, though what the authorities in Maryland thought about Virginia's authorities 
barring the veterans from their own state, on the one hand, while providing guides to 
escort them to Maryland, on the other, is not known. 174 
By the afternoon of 29 July the worst had passed, although a final large group of 
100 veterans arrived north of Alexandria at 8:30 that evening and tried to establish a 
camp. Fields met them with Frazier and told them they had 24 hours to move on or be 
expelled by local and state police. By 8:30 the next morning they departed to Frederick, 
Maryland, and Virginia was mostly free of wayward veterans, though Governor Pollard 
determined that the state police would maintain its presence in Alexandria until all the 
Bonus Marchers had left Washington. By 30 July 100 state troopers were housed in the 
National Guard Armory working in shifts to block all routes from Washington leading 
into Virginia. The District Commissioners in Washington seem to have caught on to 
173 Frazier to Pollard, 3 August 1932. 
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what was happening to their south by then, because that day they informed Governor 
Pollard that all organized bodies would be prevented from entering the District of 
Columbia unless it could be proven that their purpose was lawful. 175 By the time 
Washington shut down its own borders it no longer mattered, as Pollard had completed 
his coup by cleansing Virginia of veterans at Washington's expense. The next day so few 
veterans were left in Virginia or attempting to enter it that the number of state troopers 
present was cut from 100 to 12. Throughout the retreat from Virginia the B.E.F. was 
extremely well behaved, giving authorities no cause to resort to force at any time. 176 
That Pollard denied veterans safe passage through Virginia did not sit well with 
everyone, and citizens were sometimes quick to let the Governor know it. After 
Washington papers carried the news that Virginia had been closed to the B.E.F., Claude 
Thompson, a Virginian attorney working in Washington wrote to protest, claiming that 
Virginia had always been "a place of asylum for ... people of every creed and color," 
and asked Pollard not to "cast a foul name upon her."177 That Virginia had always been a 
place of asylum for people of every color probably would have been news to the 
thousands of African-American veterans being pushed out of the state along with their 
white comrades. Referring to the charges that many of the veterans were communists, 
F.M. Walter of McLean, Virginia, told Pollard that he might be a communist too if 
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treated as badly as those men were being treated now. 178 Monroe Blake of Alexandria 
sarcastically begged the Governor to allow him to keep his home. Blake understood by 
Pollard's handling of the B.E.F. that his own status as' a veteran made him legally 
ineligible to live any longer in the state. He submitted as a mitigating factor in his 
request for an exception to this new policy the fact that his family first settled in Virginia 
in 1635. As an aside, he begged for a pardon for his wife as well, "who unfortunately 
served as an army nurse during the World War."179 Pollard was either not amused or 
simply didn't get the intended slight, as he replied that he "required no exemption from 
any order ... to remain within our borders."180 
Although Pollard insisted in written replies to anyone who inquired that he never 
prevented any veterans from traveling through Virginia, and that hundreds had done so, 
he was being a little disingenuous. 181 He had allowed veterans to enter Virginia, but only 
those who could pay their own way, and thereby barred the vast majority. The poorest of 
the veterans were the ones who would have represented the greatest danger to the peace, 
and needed exactly the kind of special handling that Pollard denied them if a riot were to 
be avoided. That rioting didn't ensue is only because of the tremendous restraint shown 
by the veterans, and not because of anything Virginian authorities did. The only thing 
178 F.M. Walter to John G. Pollard, 30 July 1932, Governor's Papers Collection, Library of 
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Virginia offered the men of the B.E.F. was the threat of more force if they didn't leave 
the state. 
If some were upset at Governor Pollard for taking a hard line with the veterans, 
others were demanding that he do so, and the chief source of their anxiety was a proposed 
haven for the Bonus Army near Upperville, Virginia. Following the Bonus Army's 
eviction from Washington, anyone expecting it to simply dissolve and go home was met 
with the same obstinacy it had shown in June after the Senate vote. Although Walter 
Waters had originally hoped to move from Washington to Camp Bartlett, when John H. 
Bartlett withdrew his permission for the men to stay there he began urging the men to go 
home. Most of the men, though, had no homes to go to. To some extent the B.E.F. had 
given many of them purpose and meaning where previously there had been little of 
either, and it was the men themselves who determined to keep the 8.E.F. together. 
Wherever they went would have to be relatively close to Washington, be safe from 
further confrontations with the Army, and would have to be able to provide enough land 
and adequate services for up to 10,000 men. Two possibilities presented themselves in 
the days after the burning of Anacostia: Mayor Eddie McCloskey of Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania, declared his city to be a safe haven for the veterans, and Major L.J.H. 
Herwig of Upperville, Virginia, offered the veterans his 450 acre farm. For several days 
there was a very real possibility that the bulk of the Bonus Army might make Virginia 
home, and the outcry throughout the state at the prospect reveals a lot about the outlook 
of Virginians toward the 8.E.F. in even this, their most desperate hour. 
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Major Herwig and Mayor McCloskey made their offers of assistance to the B.E.F. 
immediately after their eviction from Washington, and if there was any debate between 
the men of the B.E.F. about which one to accept, it was soon settled by the reality that 
Virginia had closed its border while Maryland had not. Although Johnstown was further 
away, they couldn't get to Upperville, so there was little choice but to move to 
Pennsylvania, by way of Maryland. On 29 July 8,000 veterans began the journey to 
Johnstown, and a few days later established Camp McCloskey on the outskirts of the city. 
Camp McCloskey rivaled any of the camps the men had just left around Washington in 
sheer squalor, and it wasn't long before the outcry from local townspeople forced 
McCloskey to renege on his offer. 182 The loss of Johnstown reopened the discussion 
about Upperville, as Major Herwig had made it clear as late as 5 August that his offer still 
stood. With the veterans about to break camp from Johnstown, Virginians scrambled to 
make sure they wouldn't end up in Upperville. 183 
Virginia's newspapers had mostly moved on to other topics after the Bonus Army 
was thrown out of Washington, but at least one had kept an eye on the men at Johnstown. 
In Richmond, the Times~Dispatch had taken a few days to absorb the destruction ofthe 
veterans' camps around Washington and was now thinking about the danger of 
permitting the veterans to remain in camp, whether in Johnstown or Upperville. 
Declaring that the B.E.F. was entering a radical new phase making it a threat on the order 
of Hitler, they demanded that the federal government (presumably the Army) hit them 
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agam, cut them off from Johnstown, scatter them for good, and use whatever force 
proved necessary to do so. 184 
If Virginia's newspapers had moved on, the people who were going to have to 
live with the B.E.F. should it relocate to Upperville, had not. General William Mitchell 
lived about eight miles away from the proposed veterans camp at Upperville, and given 
his standing in the community and his previous contact with the Governor, it was natural 
that he should take the lead in opposing a veterans' camp in his backyard. Mitchell wrote 
to Pollard twice in the first week of August 
strenuously objecting to the potential presence of a 
"large group of unemployed men" staying in the 
area. Mitchell urged Pollard to do everything he 
could to prevent such a thing from coming to pass, 
and warned that if he did not it would surely "lead 
to bloodshed and violence in the end." 185 Mitchell 
went on at length to highlight the communistic 
origins of the B.E.F., and was convinced that they 
Figure 9: General Billy Mitchell 
intended to arm themselves and seize the very 
reins of government if allowed to do so. 186 Less prestigious citizens wrote the Governor 
as well, like Reverend James Smith, who begged Pollard to announce to the world that 
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"tramp camps will not be permitted" in Virginia. 187 Thomas Atkinson was glad that his 
neighbor General Mitchell had already petitioned the Governor, and wanted to add his 
voice as well to ask Pollard to intervene to keep the B.E.F. out of Virginia, assuring him 
that if he did not, he would surely feel "the seriousness of it in Richmond."188 Thomas 
Glascock of the Fauquier County Board of Supervisors asked for Pollard's help as well, 
and brought his attention to the "health and sanitation" hazards that so many men would 
bring with them to Upperville. 189 Dorsey Cullen, in addition to his previously-cited racial 
objections to the presence of the veterans in Upperville, added his concern for the safety 
of local women as well as the tourist industry, which he claimed was centered on hunting 
and other outdoors activities, and would surely suffer should the veterans make 
Upperville their home. 190 
The amazing thing about Governor Pollard's responses to several of the above is 
that, in every case, he asked the letter writer to keep him informed of developments near 
Upperville, as though he had no access to information save that being sent to him by 
random private citizens. 191 It reminds one of his reaction to the first arrival of the 
veterans in June, when events seem to have outpaced the Governor. Was it really 
possible that he had so little access to basic intelligence regarding potential mass protest 
events like the arrival of the veterans in June or the possibility they might establish camp 
187 James P. Smith, to John G. Pollard, 2 August 1932, Governor's Papers Collection, Library of 
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in Virginia in August? If so. one might forgi\'e him for consistently. with the exception 
of shutting do\\TI the border on 29 July. being n step behind e\'ents. Perhaps Virginia's 
problem in that regard was a systems or business process problem. rather than n lack of 
personal leadership from any one man; the state go\'emment of Virginia simply wasn•t 
doing a \'cry good job of gathering and disseminating information. lbe fact that Pollard 
was \\illing to take his intelligence where\'er he could get it would seem to suggest so. 
One of the more interesting pieces of mail Go\'emor Pollard n:cci\'ed in the first 
week of August came from Major llel"\ig himself. the man at the center of the storm. 
who had promised the \'eterans his land in Uppcrville. Although the Alt•.mndri" Ga:ette 
reported as late as 5 August that Major llem·ig·s offer still stood. that very day llel"\"ig 
\\TOte Pollard to assure him that he would not tum his lnnd o\'er to the B.E.F. unless he 
had the appro\'al of the Go\'emor himself. adding .. no other plnn has e\'Cr been 
contemplated by me ... 192 llemig had said pre\'iously that his neighbors were all .. unduly 
excited .. about his offer to the Bonus Army. nnd perhaps it was because he knew he could 
nc\'cr go through \\ith it. 193 Like Henry Bartlett before him. llemig couldn't persuade 
himself to offer the \'eterans asylum if his go\'cmmcnt objected. whate\'er his O\\TI 
con\'ictions on the matter. and so died the Bonus Marchers· last hope for refuge in 
Virginia. Any lingering doubts Virginians may ha\'e had were finally put to rest when 
Ma\'or McCloske\' of JohnstO\\TI. Penns\'h·ania. worked \\ith the Baltimore and Ohio 
. . . 
Railroad to provide \'Ctcrans transportation. free of charge. as far as Chicago.19" Most 
••: LJ.H. lfc:t"\\ig to John G. Poll.vd. S 1\ugust 193:?. Go\-anor's Papen Collection. Library of 
Virginia. 
.., "VA Camp Site Still 0pcn.- RidU11ond .\"l"'f-i Leader. S 1\ugus1 193:?. p. 4. 
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veterans realized that the B.E.F. had had its day and began the long journey home, and 
the Bonus Army ceased to exist. 
A couple of days later the Virginia Chapter of the American Legion held its 
annual convention. The American Legion was first formed after World War I in order to 
represent the interests of the very men who had just clamored for their money and been 
answered with tear gas. If any organization should have been expected to support full 
payment of the bonus, it would have been the American Legion. Across the country state 
chapters of that organization were doing exactly that. 195 Well before the Virginia Chapter 
met, however, its leadership had gone on record against the bonus. State Commander of 
the Virginia Chapter Dr. A.T. Finch summarized his position in an editorial in which he 
called upon Virginia's veterans to recognize their first obligation was to the nation, and 
they must put their "selfish interests" aside. 196 It was a startling position coming from the 
head of an organization whose sole purpose was to lobby for those "selfish interests," 
then let elected officials sort out what was best for the nation. 
Virginian veterans of the Bonus Army had no intention of allowing the biases of 
the Legion's leadership to determine the formal vote at the convention, so many of them, 
freshly returned from their gassing in Washington, requested permission to address the 
meeting personally. Unfortunately for the veterans only delegates, alternates, and invited 
guests were permitted to speak at the convention unless two-thirds of the delegates 
agreed to grant an exception. 197 No record of any speech from a Bonus Marcher to the 
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Legion exists, and it is very unlikely that an invitation was issued or that two-thirds of the 
delegates ever agreed to allow it. If Bonus Marchers couldn't speak on their own behalf, 
there were delegates willing to do it for them, and two factions quickly emerged: one in 
favor of immediate payment of the bonus and the other firmly opposed, whose ranks 
again included General Mitchell. At that moment Mitchell was busy rallying support 
against the proposed veterans' camp at Upperville, yet still found the time to address the 
convention personally to denounce the bonus as well. 198 Colonel John A. Cutchins took 
the lead of the faction opposed to immediate payment, arguing forcefully in favor of a 
platform that called for leadership on national issues such as adjustment of war debts and 
economy in government instead. In its strong endorsement of Colonel Cutchins' 
argument, the Richmond News Leader stated that to further the narrow interests of its 
members over those of the nation would transform the Legion into a modem day 
Praetorian Guard, an incendiary reference to the military guard of Roman Emperors 
whose legacy was that of the power behind the throne. 199 
In what the Alexandria Gazette described as "the stormiest session ever witnessed 
at a State convention of the American Legion," the delegates reached a compromise 
solution.200 Unable to brush aside entirely the demands of its 18,000 members, the 
Legion's leadership agreed to a platform that endorsed payment of the bonus "as soon as 
the government is in a position to do so."201 It was a resolution that gave a nod to the 
rank and file members but ultimately endorsed the status quo, which was essentially the 
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same as voting against immediate payment. It was the Inst word Virginia had to say on 
the matter of the Soldiers· Bonus, and once again it was "nay." 
Conclusion 
Published 39 and 72 years after the Bonus March on Washington, respectively, 
The Bonus March by Roger Daniels and The Bonus Army by Paul Dickson and Thomas 
B. Allen each suggest that the nation was generally supportive of immediate payment of 
the Soldiers' Bonus. A reading of Virginia's newspapers and other sources from that 
summer of 1932 reveals that one of two things is probably true: either they have 
misjudged the sentiment of the general public or Virginia was out of step with the rest of 
the country. Like much of the nation Virginians helped feed and transport veterans to 
Washington, occasionally gave them a place to sleep, and were generally sympathetic to 
their plight. But while donations of food, transportation, shelter, and the like represent 
sympathy for the veterans, that is very different than having sympathy for their cause, and 
on the whole, and in stark contrast to the outlook of the rest of the nation, if Daniels, 
Dickson, and Allen are correct, the Commonwealth of Virginia had no sympathy 
whatever for the cause of the Bonus Marchers. 
In every way of gauging statewide opinion measured in this study, Virginia 
demonstrated firm opposition to immediate payment of the Soldiers' Bonus. Virginia's 
legislators in Washington voted overwhelmingly against it, newspaper editorial boards 
roundly condemned it both before and after the veterans' eviction from Wa~hington, 
Virginian towns closed themselves down at different times to the veterans, and Virginia's 
own veterans generally failed to turn out to support it. Given, then, that in Virginia, 
measurable sentiment towards the Soldiers' Bonus was decisively negative, whereas it 
seems to have been relatively positive across the rest of the country, one must endeavor 
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to find an explanation. The answer may be that, in Virginia at least, the Bonus Army was 
never really just about the bonus, and it was a number of factors that had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the payment of the Soldiers' Bonus that doomed Virginians' 
support of it. 
To many Virginians the racial integration of the B.E.F. would surely have been an 
obstacle to their support. In a society governed by Jim Crow, racial integration was 
unthinkable, yet here came this mass of men converging on Washington and they were 
proving every day that racial integration was possible. Not only were African-Americans 
included within the ranks of the B.E.F., they generally weren't segregated from white 
veterans. Blacks and whites working side by side for a common political goal and doing 
so publicly in the heart of the segregationist South would have been taken by many 
Southerners as a stinging rebuke of their way of life, a way of life they had taken decades 
to build and would not lightly see attacked. The large number of black veterans included 
in the B.E.F., larger than their percentage of the original A.E.F., would have likely 
cemented Southern objections to the Bonus Army, and by extension, to their cause. 
The proximity of Virginia to the nation's capital meant a number of things to the 
average Virginian that would have also affected his support of the B.E.F. It meant that 
the number of veterans from all across the country tramping through his state was far 
greater than most, with a corresponding effect on his goodwill. It meant that the site of 
the protest was going to be right on Virginia's northern border, not some faraway place 
only read about in the papers. Virginians had to live with the Bonus Marchers on their 
doorstep for more than two months, never sure exactly what they were going to do. 
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Virginia's nearness to the District of Columbia also meant that Virginians were going to 
have to deal with the veterans en mass whenever the Bonus March ended. For the two 
months that the Bonus March lasted, the impending return march of the veterans would 
have hung over Virginians like a dangerous cloud, no one ever sure when the storm 
would break or how severe it would be. 
Finally, in Virginia there appears to have been a disdain, even sadness, over what 
many seemed to regard as the demise of a culture of service in favor of an emerging 
culture of entitlement. Able-bodied veterans demanding extra cash in exchange for past 
military service, particularly at a time when the best service they could have done their 
country would have been to ease the burdens on the treasury, not compound them, was 
nothing short of contemptible to many Virginian writers of the time. Over and over again 
in editorials, letters to the editor, and general correspondence between the most humble 
citizens and the highest government officials, Virginians took exception to the notion that 
the government owed the men of the B.E.F. anything. There was universal agreement 
that wounded men and the families of the dead must be cared for, but there was little or 
no support for providing for able-bodied men who should provide for themselves. 
As well as claiming that most of the nation supported immediate payment of the 
Soldiers' Bonus, The Bonus March and The Bonus Army focus on a national perspective, 
as does most research on the Bonus March, and both books agree that the track record of 
the leaders of the B.E.F., the federal government, and other officials and citizens was 
varied. The authors' assessments include the full spectrum of performance evaluations 
from the amazing insight of Pelham Glassford, to the paranoia of the U.S. Army, from 
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the self-control of Walter Waters, to the tremendous generosity of average 
Washingtonians. Like the federal government, the Virginia state government had an 
obligation to address the myriad problems the Bonus Army presented at its level, and like 
the federal government's performance in Washington, the record of state and local 
authorities in Virginia was mixed. On the one hand, authorities at the local level did a 
superb job of managing a crisis of the first order, while in Richmond the state 
government failed to demonstrate much leadership and struggled to develop a cohesive 
policy for managing the Bonus Army in Virginia. 
At the local level, small towns across Virginia banded together to move a tidal 
wave of men through the state, one small town at a time, during June 1932. Authorities 
had to coordinate independently with the governments of towns both before them and 
after them on the veterans' route to Washington, arrange for places to bed sometimes 
thousands of men at a time, and feed and transport them to the next town, all the while 
protecting their own communities. They did this on their own initiative, at their own 
expense, with very little information from the state or federal governments, and they did 
so with a minimum of disruption to their 0\\11 people. The performance of small town 
mayors, sheriffs, and relief workers was one of the great success stories of the Bonus 
March in Virginia. 
While local authorities across Virginia dealt with the veterans as best they could, 
the government in Richmond missed a number of opportunities to influence events. At 
the outset of the crisis, state authorities had an obvious duty to coordinate actions 
between local authorities and provide them with the resources they needed to manage the 
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stream of men moving through the state. Yet the state provided no guidance to 
subordinate governments on procedures to take, provided no transportation assets, no 
funds to ease the cost of providing commercial transportation, no relief supplies, no 
police assets, and no information about the movements of veterans. Chief Glassford in 
Washington tried to coordinate his actions with Virginia's, but his pleas for cooperation 
from Governor Pollard went mostly unanswered, and one can almost sense indifference 
in Pollard's terse replies to Glassford's requests for help. Once the veterans were in 
Washington Pollard missed another chance to influence events when he brushed off 
Jennings Wise's suggestion to bring the Richmond contingent home from Washington, 
and Pollard seemed more concerned with Wise's motives than with doing what he could 
to bring the Bonus March to a conclusion. In fact, the only proactive thing that the 
Governor of Virginia seems to have done throughout the Bonus March was to order the 
border closed to the veterans being chased out of Washington at bayonet point by the 
U.S. Army. Had he been willing, there were opportunities for him to do so much more. 
The story of Virginia and the Bonus March was bound to be unique if for no other 
reason than the fact that the Commonwealth bordered the District of Columbia, and 
perhaps no other state had more veterans pass through its borders from April through 
August of 1932. Given that distinction it shouldn't surprise anyone that Virginia's point 
of view on the entire affair and the response of its government was generally unique as 
well. 
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